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This paper presents direct evidence on the quality of health 
care in low-income settings using a unique and original set 
of audit studies, where standardized patients were presented 
to a nearly representative sample of rural public and private 
primary care providers in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. 
Three main findings are reported. First, private providers are 
mostly unqualified, but they spent more time with patients 
and completed more items on a checklist of essential his-
tory and examination items than public providers, while 
being no different in their diagnostic and treatment accu-
racy. Second, the private practices of qualified public sector 
doctors were identified and the same doctors exerted higher 
effort and were more likely to provide correct treatment 
in their private practices. Third, there is a strong positive 
correlation between provider effort and prices charged in 
the private sector, whereas there is no correlation between 
effort and wages in the public sector. The results suggest 
that market-based accountability in the unregulated private 
sector may be providing better incentives for provider effort 
than administrative accountability in the public sector in 
this setting. While the overall quality of care is low both 
sectors, the differences in provider effort may partly explain 
the dominant market share of fee-charging private providers 
even in the presence of a system of free public healthcare. 
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1 Introduction
Healthcare is a credence good with substantial information asymmetries between patients
and providers. This makes it difficult for patients to determine the quality of care they
have received, and it is widely believed therefore that unregulated market-based delivery
of healthcare is socially undesirable (Arrow, 1963)1. Further, if optimal care requires the
potential denial of services that patients value (such as steroids or antibiotics), market-
based healthcare may be over-responsive to demand, leading to socially inefficient provision
(Prendergast, 2003). Partly as a result of these considerations, the default policy approach to
delivering healthcare for the poor in most low-income countries is through free or nominally-
priced medical care in publicly-run facilities staffed by qualified doctors and nurses, who are
paid a fixed salary (World Bank, 2003).
However, a majority of households in low-income countries choose to visit fee-charging
healthcare providers in the private sector, whose market share exceeds 70 percent in rural
India (the focus of our study).2 This is surprising for two reasons. First, private healthcare
providers in India face little de facto regulation and most have no formal medical training
(Rohde and Viswanathan, 1995; Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004; CPR, 2011). Second,
while the high use of the private sector could, in part, reflect the absence of public options,
this cannot be the only explanation. In our data from rural India, the private sector share
of primary care visits (constructed from a household census) is 80 percent even in markets
with a qualified public doctor offering free care through public clinics, with more than 60
percent of these visits to private providers with no formal qualifications.
The high market share of unqualified private healthcare providers raises a number of
questions about the functioning of healthcare markets in low-income settings. First, why
would people choose to pay for care from (mostly) unqualified providers when public clinics
are staffed with qualified doctors who offer care at a much lower price? Second, how does
the quality of care received vary across public and private healthcare providers? Third, what
does an unregulated healthcare market reward and how does this compare with the regulated
public sector? Specifically, to what extent are prices in the market and wages in the public
sector correlated with quality of care? Answers to these questions have been limited by the
1It is the general social consensus, clearly, that the laissez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable.”
Kenneth J. Arrow (1963)
2The market share of private providers is high in many low-income countries: Data from the DHS show
that 50 percent of households seeking pediatric outpatient care in Africa and 70-80 percent in India visit
the private sector with little variation over the 20 years that these surveys have been collected (DHS, 2007;
Grepin, 2014). The World Health Surveys provide a more complete (but somewhat outdated) picture by
including adult morbidity and here, the numbers vary from 30 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa to between 70
and 80 percent in India (Wagstaff, 2013).
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lack of evidence on the actual quality of care provided in public and private health facilities
in low-income settings.3
This paper addresses this gap by presenting among the first direct measures of quality
of care using condition-specific metrics in low-income countries, using data from an audit
study conducted in rural areas of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (MP). Specifically,
standardized patients (SPs) were coached to accurately present symptoms for three different
conditions - unstable angina, asthma, and dysentery in a child (who is at home) - to multiple
healthcare providers. SPs then made over 1,100 unannounced visits to a near-representative
sample of public and private providers of primary healthcare services and recorded condition-
specific metrics of care for each interaction.4 These metrics include the providers’ adherence
to a checklist of questions and examinations deemed essential for making a correct diagnosis
in each case, their likelihood of pronouncing a correct diagnosis, and the appropriateness of
the treatments. For brevity, we refer to these metrics as “quality of care”.
We present results from two sets of comparisons. First, we sent SPs to a near-representative
sample of public and private health facilities and we use these data to compare the represen-
tative patient experience across public and private clinics. These differences reflect variation
in both provider composition (including knowledge and intrinsic motivation) as well as dif-
ferential incentives across public and private clinics. To isolate the effect of practicing in the
private sector holding provider characteristics constant, we identified the private practices
of qualified public doctors (the majority of whom have one) and sent SPs to present the
same medical case to the same set of doctors in both their public and private practices. Our
second comparison uses this “dual practice sample” and compares the quality of care across
the public and private practices of the same doctors on the same set of cases.
We report three main findings. First, while the majority of private providers in the
representative sample have no medical qualifications, they exerted significantly higher effort
than public providers and performed no worse on diagnosis and treatment. Private providers
spent 1.5 minutes more with patients (62 percent more), and completed 7.4 percentage point
more items on a checklist of essential history and examination items (47 percent more) than
3Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo (2004); Chaudhury et al. (2006); Das and Hammer (2007) highlight the
problem of low doctor effort in the public sector (high absence, low time spent with patients) and low
training in the private sector. There is also a large medical literature on quality of care in the public and
private sector. However, Coarasa, Das and Gummerson (2014) examine 182 cited studies in two systematic
reviews of this literature and find only one study that adjusts for differences in patients using an audit
methodology (as we do here), and no study that adjusts for differences in providers across public and private
practices (which we also do here).
4Typically used in medical education, SPs are coached to consistently portray a medical case and all of
its physical and pyscho-social aspects. When used to evaluate care in hospitals and clinics, they are also
trained to accurately recall all aspects of their interactions with the provider. See details of the measurement
protocols in section 3.
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public providers. They were equally likely to pronounce a correct diagnosis (only 4 percent
of public providers do so), to offer a correct treatment (27 percent of public providers do so),
or to offer clinically unnecessary treatments (provided by 70 percent of public providers).
Second, in the dual practice sample the same doctors spent more time with SPs, com-
pleted more items on the checklist, and were also more likely to offer a correct treatment in
their private practices, relative to their public practices. Notably, we do not find evidence
of differential over-treatment, with equivalently high rates of unnecessary treatments, use
of antibiotics, and total number of medicines in both types of practices. These differences
are conditional on seeing the doctor and therefore understate the difference in the quality
of patient experiences across public and private practices of the same doctor, because the
expected number of trips to the clinic to see a qualified doctor is considerably higher in the
public practice (due to high absence rates).
Third, we find a positive correlation between the fees charged by private providers and
measures of quality such as the time spent, the fraction of checklist items completed, and
likelihood of providing a correct treatment. However, we also find a positive correlation
between prices and the total number of medications given - including unnecessary treatment.
In the public clinics, SPs were provided free or nominally-priced care. Since there is no
variation in prices, we examine the correlation between doctors’ compensation and quality
of care and find no correlation between salaries (or desirability of posting) in the public
sector and any measure of quality of care delivered.
Further, while public healthcare is free to the consumer, it is not free to the taxpayer. We
calculate the per-patient cost in the public sector and conservatively estimate it to be four
times higher than the fees charged by private providers in our sample. Thus, the unregulated
private market for healthcare in rural MP, which is mainly staffed by unqualified providers,
appears to deliver higher provider effort and comparable quality of care, at a much lower
cost per patient.
To help interpret our results, we develop a simple theoretical framework that models
provider-patient interactions in two stages: consultation and treatment. Patients present
their initial symptoms to the provider, based on which he forms a prior distribution regarding
the true ailment. Higher effort in the consultation stage yields a more precise posterior
distribution. The treatment choice is determined by a combination of the physician’s desire to
cure the patient, market incentives for over-treatment, and patients’ demand for medication.
The main insight of the model is that while providers will typically exert more effort in
their private practice, the effect on overall patient health is ambiguous. If the default effort
level of doctors under low-powered incentives is reasonably high, the marginal gains from
additional effort in private practice are outweighed by the costs of over-treatment resulting
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from market incentives. On the other hand, if the default effort level is low, the benefits of
higher effort in the private sector (and the resulting increase in precision of the posterior)
may outweigh the costs of over-treatment under market incentives.
Our methodological contribution helps address the fundamental problem of inferring qual-
ity in healthcare, where the optimal action is patient and condition specific, and inefficiencies
include under-treatment, over-treatment, or both (Pauly, 1980). Specifically, there are four
advantages to the use of unannounced SPs relative to existing measures in the literature,
which are based on tests of provider knowledge, observation of medical practices or analysis
of prescriptions.5
First, the use of SPs ensures a common set of patient and illness characteristics, which
limits concerns about differential patient sorting across clinics on the basis of personal or
illness characteristics, as might be the case when observing real patient-provider interactions.
Second, the SP method allows us to objectively score the quality of care using condition-
specific metrics (checklist completion, diagnosis, and treatment) because we know the actual
illness being presented and the optimal care associated with the case. In the case of real
observations, we would observe only the presenting symptoms and would have to speculate
about the true underlying illness. Third, we are able to observe prices charged for completed
transactions, which allows us to study to what extent the unregulated market rewards quality,
which improves upon audit studies in other settings that obtain price quotes but do not
complete the purchase.6 Finally, Hawthorne effects are not a concern in the SP context
because providers do not know that they are being observed.
Substantively, the advances in measurement above combined with our ability to observe
the same doctor across public and private practices allow us to provide the first direct
comparison of the quality of care across public and private sectors.7 We also provide the first
evidence on how market prices for healthcare behave in an unregulated setting and show that
there is a positive correlation between price and checklist completion/correct treatment, but
also between price and unnecessary treatments. This suggests that in unregulated markets
5Medical vignettes, which measure provider knowledge, allow for standardization of case-mix, but do not
measure provider practice, which has been shown to differ markedly from provider knowledge in multiple
contexts (Rethans et al., 1991; Leonard and Masatu, 2005; Das and Hammer, 2007).
6For instance, first price offers can be very different from the price of the completed transaction if the
distribution of willingness to pay is different across populations. See for instance, Ayres and Siegelman
(1995) and Goldberg (1996) for an example of how the lack of completed sales data can lead to misleading
conclusions in audit studies of car sales. In our case, the “sale” is always completed as the SP leaves only
after the provider has completed the interaction and the price has been paid.
7Our approach extends a literature testing for moral hazard in agricultural labor markets by comparing
worker effort and output under different contractual arrangements (Shaban, 1987; Foster and Rosenzweig,
1994a,b) to a credence good setting where output is harder to measure for both customers and researchers,
and where there is substantial direct provision of the good by the public sector.
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for healthcare, market prices do reflect some information on the quality of care, but also
that patients cannot evaluate whether they are being over-treated and charged for medically
unnecessary treatments.
These findings are consistent with the broader empirical literature on credence goods that
has demonstrated over-provision of services to the detriment of customer welfare in settings
ranging from caesarian sections to car mechanics and cab rides for tourists (Wolinsky, 1993;
Gruber and Owings, 1996; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter,
2011; Schneider, 2012). As is well known, inefficiencies in market provision do not imply that
public provision will do better and a key contribution of our paper is the ability to compare
public and private provision of a canonical credence good such as healthcare.
Combined with our theoretical framework, our results suggest that in settings of poor
governance and administrative accountability in the delivery of healthcare through the public
sector (Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004; Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster, 2008), market-
based provision of healthcare may present a legitimate alternative in spite of its many the-
oretical (and empirical) weaknesses. Our results have direct implications for global policy
debates on the organization and delivery of healthcare services in low-income countries with
low state capacity to deliver effective oversight over public healthcare systems. We discuss
these along with caveats in the conclusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes healthcare provision
in rural India and MP; section 3 describes the standardized patient (SP) methodology, our
measures of healthcare quality, and discusses sampling and representativeness; section 4
presents a simple theoretical framework to interpret our results; section 5 presents the main
results; section 6 discusses pricing and cost-effectiveness; section 7 discusses robustness to
alternative explanations, and section 8 concludes with a discussion of policy implications
and caveats.
2 Context
2.1 Healthcare in Rural India
Healthcare in India is delivered by both public and private clinics and hospitals. In the
public sector, patients can obtain primary care on a walk-in basis in facilities differentiated
by their level of specialization ranging from district hospitals and Community Health Centers
(CHCs) to Public Health Centers (PHCs), and sub-centers.8 PHCs, CHCs, and hospitals
are supposed to be staffed with trained doctors, who are expected to make diagnoses and
8Official guidelines stipulate that there should be a sub-center for every 5,000 people, a primary health
care center for every 25,000 people, and a community health center for every 100,000 people.
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either treat or refer patients as appropriate. Sub-centers are supposed to be staffed with
qualified nurses with doctors visiting on a fixed rotation. Most doctors hold a Bachelor of
Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) degree, the rough equivalent of an MD in the
US, and receive a fixed salary from the government, with no variable compensation based
on either patient load or quality of care.9
Consultations in public clinics are free or nominally priced. Patients are also supposed
to receive free medication, if available. Although a federally-funded insurance program for
inpatient hospital care was introduced in 2007, at the time of our study, the tax-funded
public system of care was the only source of (implicit) public insurance in the system at the
time of this study.
Although public facilities are theoretically accountable to administrative norms and pro-
cedures (documented in the Civil Service Codes for each state), both the perceptions of staff
members and process measures of effort suggest severe deficiencies. Nationwide, doctor ab-
sences averaged 43 percent on any given day in 2003 and 40 percent in 2010 (CPR, 2011;
Muralidharan et al., 2011). These absences do not occur on predictable days or hours (Baner-
jee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004) and they are not easy to address at a system-level (Banerjee,
Duflo and Glennerster, 2008; Hanna and Dhaliwal, 2015). When asked about adherence
to administrative rules, more than 80 percent of public sector doctors agree that the rules
and norms are frequently flouted and that appropriate ‘payments’ can allow providers to
circumvent disciplinary proceedings, even due to grave negligence (La Forgia and Nagpal,
2014).
While official policy documents of the Government mainly focus on improving the public
system of primary healthcare (Planning Commission of India, 2013), data from household
surveys consistently show that the fee-charging private sector accounts for over 70 percent
of primary care visits (DHS, 2007; Selvaraj and Karan, 2009; CPR, 2011). Barriers to entry
for private healthcare providers are low. Provider qualifications range from MBBS degrees
to no medical training at all, and clinics can range from well-equipped structures to small
one-room shops, the provider’s residence, or the patients’ home for providers that make
home visits. Providers operate on a fee-for-service basis, and prices often include the cost
of medicines. While providers operating without a medical license are not legal and face
the threat of an occasional raid, they have come to be the dominant source of care in these
9India also recognizes medical degrees from alternative schools of medicine including the BAMS (Bachelors
in Ayurvedic Medical Sciences), the BHMS (Bachelor of Homeopathic Medical Sciences) and the BUMS
(Bachelor of Unani Medical Sciences). However, providers with these qualifications are only licensed to
prescribe medication in line with their training and are not given prescription rights on allopathic medicine.
They also are not typically posted in the frontline healthcare system of PHCs, CHCs, and district hospitals
that prescribe allopathic medicine.
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markets (as the data below will show).
2.2 Market Sampling and Summary Statistics
Our study was carried out in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (MP), one of India’s
poorer states, with a GDP/capita of ∼$600/year (or ∼$1500/year in PPP terms) in 2010-
11 (the period of the study). We first drew a representative sample of 100 villages across 5
districts, stratified by geographic region and an index of health outcomes. We then conducted
a household census in these villages, where we asked respondents to name all providers
from whom they sought primary care in the past thirty days and their locations (including
providers outside the village, but in market clusters on the nearest main road). We then
surveyed all providers in all of these locations, regardless of whether or not the providers
themselves had been mentioned in the sample villages, thereby obtaining a census of all
providers in the healthcare market that catered to sampled villages.
Table 1 (columns 1-3) presents summary statistics based on the provider census (Panel A)
and the household census (Panel B) in these markets; columns 4-6 compare villages sampled
for the SP study to the representative villages. The table highlights three key features of
the health market in rural India. First, villages are served by a large number of providers
once the health market is correctly accounted for by including clusters on major roads close
to the village. There are 11 primary care providers per market and 46 percent of households
reported visiting a primary care provider in the 30 days prior to the survey.
Second, the majority of providers are private (7 out of 11 or 64 percent), and they
account for 89 percent of household visits; excluding paramedical public health workers
(typically responsible for preventive, maternity and child care) increases the fraction further
to 93 percent. The share of visits to private providers (with or without qualifications) is 88
percent when there is a public provider in the market, and is 83 percent even when there is
a public MBBS doctor in the same market.
Third, 48 percent of all providers and 77 percent of all private providers (5.4 per village)
have no formal medical training, but account for 77 percent of household visits. There is less
than one MBBS doctor per market, and 94 percent are available only outside the village.
The distribution of MBBS providers is uneven. Only 30 percent of all villages have recourse
to an MBBS provider (public or private) in their market, and only 5 percent within village
boundaries. Private unqualified providers remain the dominant providers of care in most
settings, accounting for 74 percent of all visits when there is a public provider in the same
market, and 60 percent when there is a public MBBS doctor in the same market.10 MBBS
10Note that even public facilities have a substantial number of unqualified providers. While these are
typically support staff (who are only supposed to assist a qualified doctor), we find that it is very common
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doctors account for only 4 percent of all patient interactions (Panel B).
3 Measuring Healthcare Quality Using Standardized Patients
3.1 The Standardized Patient (SP) Methodology
Used routinely in the training and evaluation of medical students in high-income countries,
including the United States, SPs are highly-trained ‘fake patients’ who present symptoms of
an illness to a physician like any other normal patient. Details of the SP interaction are then
used to evaluate the quality of care received by a typical patient (Rethans et al., 1991). SPs
are coached to present their initial symptoms and answer any questions that the physician
may ask as part of history taking, in a manner consistent with the underlying condition.
We followed the same method (adapted to local conditions) and sent unannounced SPs to
healthcare providers in our sample during the course of a normal working day.
A total of 22 SPs were recruited from the districts where the study was conducted.
Using a team comprising of a professional SP trainer, two medical doctors, and a medical
anthropologist familiar with the local forms of presenting symptoms and illnesses, SPs were
coached to accurately and consistently present one of three cases - unstable angina in a
45 year-old male, asthma in a 25 year-old female or male, and dysentery in a child who
was at home presented by the father of the child (see Das et al. (2012) and Appendix
B for details on the SP protocols).11 SPs visited sampled providers, who did not know
they were receiving standardized patients and therefore should have treated them as new
patients.12 After the interaction, SPs were debriefed within an hour with a structured
questionnaire that documented the questions and examinations that the provider completed
or recommended, the treatments provided, and any diagnoses offered. The SPs retained any
medicines dispensed in the clinic and paid all fees charged by providers at the end of the
interaction.
The SPs depicted uncomplicated textbook presentations of the cases, and a panel of doc-
tors who advised the project concurred that appropriate history taking and examinations
should lead providers towards the correct diagnosis and treatment. Cases were specifically
for these staff to be the main healthcare providers in public clinics and also prescribe medication (given high
doctor absence rates).
11Das et al. (2012) discusses the SP methodology in further detail, and presents summary statistics on
overall quality of care in this setting. The current paper focuses on the economics of unregulated healthcare
markets and we do not replicate the analysis in Das et al. (2012). See Appendix B for further details
on how the SP method was implemented. Details on case presentations and instruments are posted on
www.healthandeducationinindia.org
12The research ethics board of Innovations for Poverty Action approved this design following a successful
pilot with informed consent in Delhi. We describe sampling and representativeness in the next section.
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chosen so that the opening statement by the SPs would be consistent with multiple underly-
ing illnesses, but further questioning should have led to an unambiguous (correct) diagnosis.
This allows us to measure provider quality through adherence to an essential checklist of
questions and examinations that would allow them to accurately make a diagnosis and pro-
vide a correct treatment. We also chose these cases since they represented conditions with
high or growing incidence in India and other middle- and low-income countries and mini-
mized risk to SPs that could arise from unsafe invasive examinations, such as a blood test
with an unsterilized needle.
We also picked cases where the role of suitable medical advice was important because real
patients would be unlikely to be able to categorize them as “life threatening” or “potentially
non-harmful” and triage themselves into clinics or hospitals. For instance, the SP with
unstable angina complains of chest pain which, even in countries with advanced health
systems, is often mistaken by patients as arising from heartburn, exertion or muscle strain.13
Similarly, wheezing and shortness of breath in asthma may arise from short-term allergies
to environmental contaminants. Finally, for any child with diarrhea, a key contribution of a
health care provider is to assess whether the symptoms reflect a bacterial or viral infection
(and thus whether the patient requires antibiotics) and the degree of dehydration - each of
which may be difficult for parents to assess.
3.2 Healthcare Provider Sampling and Summary Statistics
Our study first uses the census of healthcare providers described earlier to construct a near
representative sample of public and private healthcare providers in rural MP in three of
the five sampled districts. While our SPs were recruited from the districts in our sample,
they were never residents of the villages where they presented themselves to health providers.
Since providers in rural areas might know their patients, the SPs had to justify their presence
in the area by mentioning, for example, work-related travel or visits to relatives. For such
excuses to be plausible, our final sample dropped villages that could not be accessed by paved
roads and comprised of a total of 46 villages across three districts. While these sampled
villages have more providers on average than the entire representative set of villages, there
is no difference in the composition of providers across the frame and sample (Table 1).
Since SPs visited clinics to obtain primary care, we excluded community health workers,
midwives, and providers that only made home visits. We sampled providers in all public
clinics (up to two providers per clinic) and a maximum of six private providers in each
market for a total of 247 providers in 235 clinics, and SPs completed interactions with 224
13The REACT study in the United States found that many chest pain patients delayed calling 911 because
they confused their symptoms with heartburn (Faxon and Lenfant, 2001).
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providers.14 Details of the sampling and the visits are in Appendix A.
Data from this ‘representative sample’ allow us to compare care provided across typical
public and private clinics in rural MP (all our estimates are re-weighted by the inverse of
the sampling probabilities to provide population representative averages). However, this
comparison would reflect a combination of varying composition of providers (including their
knowledge or professionalism), as well as the effect of practicing in the private sector.
To isolate the role of private sector practice, we identified the universe of public MBBS
doctors posted to PHCs and CHCs from all five study districts, even if these clinics were
not located in the village-based sampling scheme. We then identified the private practices
of these doctors (we found a private practice for 61 percent). We sampled and successfully
administered SP visits to 118 public MBBS doctors. Our ‘dual sample’ consists of the 88
doctors in this MBBS sample who also have a private practice, and for 69 of these, SPs
presented cases in both their public and private practices. The ‘dual sample’ enables a
comparison of the quality of care provided by the same doctor on the same case across his
public and private practices. We note that our completion rates were higher in the private
(93 percent) compared to public practices (75 percent). The lower public sector completion
rates resulted from long-term absences and leave among sampled public sector providers,
leading to non-completion despite multiple attempts. If (a) there is heterogeneity in the
public-private difference across doctors, and (b) doctors who are more absent also provide
lower quality care in their public sector practice, our public-private differences may be under-
estimated. Appendix A and Tables A.1 and A.2 provide further details on the sampling and
construction of the representative and the dual sample of providers.
Table 2 (columns 1-3) provides summary statistics for the representative sample of
providers. The providers are mostly middle-aged men and just under 60 percent have com-
pleted 12 or more years of education (Table 2, Panel A). Providers practices have been open
for 13-15 years, and private and public providers self-report an average of 16 and 28 pa-
tients per day, respectively. Most practices (82 percent of private and 100 percent of public)
dispense medicines in the clinic itself and are equipped with the infrastructure and medical
devices required for routine examinations, such as stethoscopes and blood pressure cuffs.
In the representative sample, public providers are more likely to have an MBBS degrees
(26 percent vs. 8 percent) and private providers charge an average of Rs.51 per interac-
tion. Consistent with nominally priced public care, our SPs paid Rs.3.7 on average in public
clinics.
Column 4 presents summary statistics on the universe of public MBBS doctors, while
14In one case, a sampled village was near a market with over a hundred different healthcare providers. In
this one case, we sampled over 20 private providers. See Appendix A for details on sampling.
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columns 5-7 present these for the 88 public MBBS doctors in the dual sample and test
if they are comparable. Overall, doctors with and without dual practices are similar on
observable characteristics, but the former have a longer tenure at their current location.
There is no significant difference in the equipment reported across these practices (Columns
8-10), although the overall number of patients seen is higher in the public practice and the
fees charged are higher in the private practice.
We randomly assigned three SPs to each sampled provider in the representative sample,
one presenting each of the three cases. For the dual sample, we sent SPs presenting the
asthma and dysentery cases to both practices of the same provider.15 Since the rarity of
unstable angina could raise suspicions if providers saw two travelers presenting the same case
(even though visits were typically separated by a few weeks), we randomized the providers
into two groups - one that received an unstable angina patient in his/her private practice
and another that received the case in the public clinic. We show that the randomization was
valid in Table A.3.
3.3 Measuring Quality of Care
We use three measures of quality of care. Our first metric is the extent to which the provider
adhered to a checklist of questions and examinations required for making a differential diag-
nosis on each of the presented cases. For instance, these questions and exams would allow a
doctor to distinguish between heartburn (that has gastrointestinal origins) and a heart at-
tack, or between viral diarrhea and dysentery. These items represent a parsimonious subset
of the Indian government’s own guidelines, and the list we use was developed by a panel of
Indian and American doctors (the items are described for each case in Table A.4).16 While
the most transparent measure of checklist adherence is the percentage of checklist items
completed, we also compute an index score using Item Response Theory (IRT), which gives
more weight to items that discriminate better among providers. Developed in the context of
15Since we had 22 SPs and 3 cases, we made sure that the same case was presented by different SPs in
the public and private practices. To ensure that our standardized patients saw the sampled provider when
(s)he visited the public clinic and not a substitute, we first interviewed all providers in their private practices
or residences without revealing that we knew they also worked in the public sector, and we obtained either
their photograph or a detailed description of their physical appearance. SPs portrayed a dummy case (e.g.
headache) if the doctor was absent when they visited the public clinic, and we sent in other SPs on our
subsequent attempts. As we discuss later, it took significantly more trips to complete an SP case in the
public practice relative to the private one, due to the high rates of provider absence in the public practice.
16The Indian government’s National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) has developed triage, management,
and treatment protocols for unstable angina, asthma, and dysentery in public clinics, suggesting clear guide-
lines for patients presenting with any of these conditions. The checklist we use is more parsimonious than
what the Indian government’s own guidelines recommend. If we use the more extensive checklist, this would
deflate the checklist adherence further below the low numbers that we document, but does not affect the
relative performance of public and private providers (which is the focus of this paper).
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educational testing, IRT allows us to create a composite measure of provider quality based
on questions asked across all three cases, with lower weights on checklist items that are less
essential and higher weights on more essential questions that do a better job of discriminat-
ing between low and high quality providers (see Das and Hammer (2005) for details). We
report both measures in our analysis.
Second, we examine diagnoses - whether or not the provider uttered any diagnosis to the
patient and the accuracy of the diagnosis. We consider a diagnosis incorrect when it cannot
even be considered partially correct - for example, a provider tells an asthma patient that
she has a gastrointestinal problem or an unstable angina patient that the weather is causing
his ailment. Our definitions of correct and incorrect diagnoses are presented in Table A.4 -
Panel B.
Third, we evaluate the quality of treatment provided. SPs noted all treatment instruc-
tions received and retained all prescriptions and medication dispensed in the clinic. These
were then classified as correct, palliative, and/or unnecessary /harmful, based on inputs from
our panel of doctors, pharmacists, and a pharmaceutical company (Table A.4 - Panel C lists
the specific treatments that fall into each category). Since providers can dispense or prescribe
multiple medicines, we classify each medicine as correct, palliative, or unnecessary/harmful
and thus allow the total treatment protocol to be classified into multiple categories at the
same time.
Correct treatment refers to a treatment that is clinically indicated for the specific case
and that would relieve/mitigate the underlying condition. Palliative treatments are those
that may provide symptomatic relief, or treatments where the providers correctly identified
which system was being affected, but which on their own would not cure the patient of the
condition that was being presented - for example, allergy medicine for the asthma patient.
Treatments classified as unnecessary/harmful were neither correct nor palliative. We group
these two potentially distinct categories together because it was difficult to achieve consensus
among doctors on what should be considered harmful. Some, for example, would consider
antibiotics for the unstable angina patient unnecessary. Others could take a longer view with
antibiotic resistance in mind and consider it as ultimately harmful. However, none of the
treatments we observed were directly contra-indicated, and hence most of these represent
unnecessary treatments as opposed to directly harmful ones.17
17If the overall quality of care were higher, we could have designed the SP case with a patient who is
allergic to certain kinds of antibiotics or who is on regular medication for another illness. In this case, many
treatments would have been harmful and the case would have required the doctor to watch out for drug
interactions. Given the low-level of overall quality of care, designing such an SP case would not have been
very useful at discriminating quality because SPs were never asked about existing allergies or whether they
were currently taking any medication.
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However, even after classifying all medicines as correct, palliative, and unnecessary, there
are two challenges in coding the “correctness” of a treatment. The first is: How should we
interpret a referral when incentives are very different? In some cases, this may be a good
thing (if, for example, the provider refers a heart attack patient to a hospital). In other
cases, a “referral” may simply reflect a provider who deflected the case without directing the
patient usefully.18 Since we do not send the SPs to the place that was referred, there is no
obvious way of coding the quality of referrals. We therefore try to be conservative in our
main analysis and do not treat referrals as correct treatments. When we repeat the analysis
treating referrals as correct in the angina case, our results are unchanged (results below).
A second challenge in classifying treatments arises from the proxy nature of the dysentery
case. Many providers did not provide a treatment because the child was not presented and
instead asked to see the child. We therefore report results for ‘checklist completion’ using all
three cases, but drop the dysentery case for ‘diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’ because the patient
(the sick child) was not actually presented for this case. All results are robust to dropping
the case completely.
4 Theoretical Framework
A simple theoretical framework helps interpret the results and the optimal effort and treat-
ment choices that a provider is likely to make with and without market incentives, as well as
the effects of their choices on patient health outcomes. We present the main insights here,
with full derivations in Appendix C. The interaction between doctors and patients is mod-
elled in two stages - consultation and treatment - where providers first engage in (Bayesian)
learning about the patient’s condition and then treat. A patient enters the clinic and presents
her symptoms, based on which the provider forms a prior belief about the underlying disease








The provider, who has medical knowledge, K, exerts effort e and draws a signal s ∼
N(ntrue, 1
β
), where ntrue is the correct underlying state and β = eK. Providers improve the
precision of the signal by either exerting higher effort, or being more knowledgeable, or both.
The provider’s posterior belief is then:
18Field notes from the SPs suggest that this often happened in public clinics where the healthcare provider
had no interest in seeing the patient, and did not ask questions or conduct any examinations before telling
the patient to go elsewhere. By necessity, this is coded as a “referral” in our data, although the patient









where µ is the posterior mean given by19:
µ = αν
α + β +
βs
α + β (3)
In the second stage, the provider makes treatment choices based on the posterior belief
about the true state. The choice of treatments is expressed as an interval [µ − n, µ + n],
which maps into the empirical observation that most providers in our setting provide multiple
medications. A wider range of treatments has a higher probability of covering the true illness
and curing the patient of the current ailment, but also increases long-term health costs.20
The patient’s health outcome given e and n is denoted by H(e, n) = Pe(n) − h(n), where
Pe(n) is the probability that ntrue is covered by the treatment and h(n) is the health cost
increasing with n. Thus the optimal outcome for a patient is to receive only the correct
treatment, and not receive any additional unnecessary treatments, and we can think of a
high-quality provider as someone who provides this outcome, enabled by a precise posterior
distribution of the true illness.
In practice, providers will choose effort and treatments to maximize their own utility,
which may not be aligned with those of patients. We model provider utility as having three
components. First, providers care about curing their patients and overall patient health.
This can be attributed partly to altruism, partly to intrinsic motivation to do the right
thing, partly to training and professionalism (Hippocratic oath), partly to peer pressure
and monitoring, and partly to the liability and malpractice regime. We capture all of these
factors with the parameter φ, which should be thought about as representing the extent
to which providers value patient health in their utility in a setting without high-powered
financial incentives. Thus, a higher φ represents greater alignment between provider and
patient utility.
Second, providers also care about financial rewards, which in turn depends on how they
are compensated. Under market pricing, providers can charge a consultation fee (τe) that
is a function of a piece rate τ (determined by their qualifications and reputation) and effort
19Note that the marginal effect of e on the posterior precision diminishes as e becomes larger as illustrated
in Figure 1 (Panel B). Also, as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) a doctor with more knowledge may also have a
more accurate prior to begin with (or draw a signal with a more accurate mean), in addition to learning faster
with additional effort/time. This is not our area of focus as we are more interested in deriving predictions
for effort, treatment, and health outcomes for the same doctor across public (low-powered incentives) and
private (high-powered incentives) practices. This corresponds to our dual sample.
20This is a standard assumption in the medical literature and can be motivated by either the building of
resistance to unnecessary drugs or by the potential for adverse interactions between drugs.
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expended (which is observable to patients), and a dispensing fee that increases linearly with
the number of medicines provided. They also have an incentive for improving patient health
because this helps build their reputation and raises future demand (which we model as an
increase in their consulting piece rate over time). However, patients can observe whether they
were “cured” more easily than the costs of excessive medication, and this creates an incentive
to over-treat because over-treatment increases the probability of spanning the true illness
and providing a correct treatment. We denote the observed health outcome as Ho(e, n), and
true health as H(e, n).
Third, providers may offer treatments on the basis of patient demand. Patients may
self-diagnose their illnesses and demand medications that they think they need,21 or may
simply seek pain-killers, steroids, and other drugs that provide symptomatic relief but are
medically inappropriate for their condition. In such cases it can be costly for providers to
not provide medicines that patients demand, and we model patient-induced demand as a
communication cost paid by providers to convince patients about the providers’ choice of
treatment.
In the absence of market incentives and patient-induced demand, providers optimize over:
V1 = max
e




where V1 and V2(e) are the maximized utilities in the consultation and treatment stage,
and they choose a corresponding level of effort and treatment. Since there is no marginal
incentive for either effort or treatment, these will depend only on φ and the cost of effort.
The provider then chooses n that maximizes H(e, n) in the treatment stage (assuming that
medicines are provided free to patients as is the norm in public clinics).
Under market incentives a doctors maximize:
V1 = max
e
{−c(e) + τe+ V2(e)} (6)
V2(e) = max
n
{φH(e, n) + δHo(e, n) + np} (7)
where τ is a piece-rate consultation fee, δ represents the extent to which improving
patients’ current health improves the provider’s reputation in the market and generates future
pay-offs (we formalize this in Appendix C), and p is a per unit profit from n. Because the
health cost of n is not fully observed in the market but the provider derives pecuniary benefits
21For instance, Cohen, Dupas and Schaner (2015) show that patients with a fever in Kenya often self-
diagnose themselves as having malaria and try to obtain anti-malaria treatments though these are not
medically warranted.
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from n, s/he chooses excessive n where H(e, n) is decreasing in n. However, compensation for
effort (τe) and concern about reputation induces higher effort, which yields a more accurate
posterior and increases the probability of the chosen n spanning the true illness. Finally,
it is important that the costs of excessive medication are observed to some extent (albeit
imperfectly), because this bounds n from going to infinity.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the main insights of the model. Market incentives typically lead
to higher effort, as shown in panel (A) of Figure 1. When φ is low, providers choose low level
of effort without other incentives, and the difference in the level of effort with and without
market incentives leads to large difference in the posterior precision (panel (B)). Thus, while
market compensation provides an incentive to over-treat, it also provide incentives for greater
diagnostic effort, which yields a more precise posterior. Since increased posterior precision
reduces the benefit of choosing large n, it is possible that n may be smaller with market
incentives as shown in panel (C). With higher effort leading to a greater probability of
providing the correct treatment and a smaller n (due to increased diagnostic precision) the
resulting health outcome is better with market incentives. However, as φ increases, the
default level of effort without market incentives also increases, and the marginal gain from
additional effort on posterior precision is lower and the benefits of additional effort under
market incentives are outweighed by the incentives to prescribe more. In this setting (seen
in Panel D) providers choose larger n with market incentives, and the health outcomes are
likely to be worse than that without market incentives.22
Figure 2 summarizes this point that market incentives are likely to lead to worse outcomes
in settings with a high φ, as may be typical in high-income countries. However, in settings
with very low φ as seen in India and other low-income countries - exemplified by high doctor
absence rates (Chaudhury et al., 2006) - market incentives may lead to better outcomes.
Finally, we also add patient-induced demand to the provider’s optimization problem.
With this cost, we get n closer to the value which the patient demands, though the cost is
lower for providers who exert higher consultation effort (because this effort makes it easier
to convince patients that their desired n is not good for them). This mechanism provides a
plausible explanation for the high levels of unnecessary treatment we observe among public
providers (who have no marginal incentive to do so).23
22See Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) for an adaptation of the multi-tasking framework of Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) that yields similar insights in the context of performance-linked
pay for teachers (showing that outcomes could improve under performance pay if the default level of teacher
effort was low, but could worsen if the default level was high). The key difference in our context is that
the high-powered incentives do not come from administratively set performance-linked bonuses, but market
rewards for performance.
23Note that patient-induced demand is not necessary to explain high levels of unnecessary treatment in
public clinics (though it may partly do so). Since a less precise posterior is correlated with giving out more
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Appendix C formally presents our framework in two parts. We first focus on specifying
and solving the provider’s utility maximization problem but do not endogenize the price
setting process - because the static framework maps into our data and is adequate to inter-
pret our empirical results. The second part provides one way of endogenizing the market
incentives, and is shown for theoretical completeness.
5 Results - Quality of Care across Public and Private Providers
5.1 Estimation Framework
Our main interest is in estimating differences in the quality of care that patients received
from providers in the public and private sectors. In the representative sample, we estimate:
q(i(scp)m) = β0 + β1Privateip + β2Xp + δs + δc + δm + i(scp)m (8)
where we regress each measure of quality q (checklist completion, diagnosis, and treat-
ment) in interaction i between a standardized patient s presenting case c, and a provider
p in market m on an indicator for the sector (Private), with β1 being the term of interest.
Since we pool cases and SPs and there may be systematic differences across them, all our
specifications include SP and case fixed effects (δs and δc). We report three sets of estimates
for each quality measure. First, we include only SP and case fixed effects; then we add mar-
ket fixed effects so that comparisons reflect relative performance in the same market (note
that not all markets had both types of providers); finally, we add controls for provider and
practice characteristics Xp, to adjust for observable differences between public and private
providers.
While β1 provides a useful estimate of the differences in quality across public and private
providers in a representative sample of providers, it is a composite estimate that includes
differences in unobservable provider characteristics, as well as the effect of practicing in the
private sector. To isolate the impact of private sector practice, we re-estimate equation 8 in
the dual sample that only includes data from the cases where we sent the SPs to the public
and private practices of the same MBBS doctor. We report three sets of estimates here as
well. First, we include only SP and case fixed effects;24 then we add district fixed effects (since
medication, our model predicts that less knowledgeable providers as well as those who put in low effort will
give out more medicines.
24Note that we do not include provider fixed effects since the angina case was not presented in both the
public and private practices of the same doctor, and will drop out if we do so. Since the case was randomly
allocated across the public and private practices of the doctor and assignment was balanced on measures of
quality on the other case (see Table A.3), our estimates will be an unbiased estimate of the average quality
difference across the public and private practices of public MBBS doctors. We also estimate equation 8 with
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the dual practice sample was drawn from the universe of public MBBS doctors practicing
in each district rather than the universe of providers practicing in sampled villages, as was
the case for the representative sample); finally, we include controls for observable differences
across the public and private practices of the doctors.
5.2 Completion of Essential Checklist of History Taking and Examinations
Columns 1-3 in Table 3 present results from estimating equation 8 in the representative
sample. Our outcome variable is ‘provider effort’, measured by consultation length and
checklist completion. While the results are similar across the three specifications, we focus
our discussion on the estimates in Panel B, because they compare relative performance within
the same market (without controlling for provider characteristics), which is the relevant
choice set for patients. Base levels of effort among representative public providers are low.
The average public provider spent 2.4 minutes with the SP in a typical interaction and
completed 16 percent of checklist items. Private providers spend 1.5 minutes more per
patient and complete 7.4 percentage points more items on the checklist (62 percent and 47
percent more than the public providers respectively). When evaluated on the IRT scaled
score, private providers score 0.61 standard deviations higher. Figure A.1 shows that time
spent with the patient is strongly correlated with the number of checklist items completed,
which points to the appropriateness of the checklist, as more time spent with the patient led
to greater checklist completion.
Columns 4-6 repeat the analysis in the dual sample, with similar results. Public MBBS
doctors appear to be more productive than the typical public provider in the representative
sample (many of whom are unqualified) because they complete a slightly higher fraction
of checklist items (18 percent) in 35 percent less time (0.9 minutes less). However, this
additional productivity is not used to complete more checklist items in the public practice,
but rather to reduce the time spent with patients (1.56 minutes versus 2.4 minutes in the
representative sample). In their private practices, the same doctors doubled consultation
length, completed 50 percent more checklist items, and scored 0.73 standard deviations higher
on the IRT-scaled measure of quality. It is worth comparing these differences with those
obtained in interventions that are regarded as highly successful. For instance, Gertler and
Vermeersch (2013) look at checklist completion as a result of the introduction of performance
pay in Rwanda. They find that performance pay increased checklist completion by 0.16
standard deviations; we find that the difference in checklist completion across public and
private practices of the same doctor is five times larger.
provider fixed effects and the results are unchanged (but driven by variation in the asthma case).
19
These differences are seen clearly in Figures 3-5. Figure 3 plots the cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDF) of the IRT-score (based on checklist completion) of public and private
providers in the representative sample, Figure 4 does so for the dual sample, and Figure 5
pools all four samples together (Figures A.2 - A.4 plot the corresponding distributions). Dis-
tributions of checklist completion for private providers first-order stochastically dominates
that of the public providers (Figure 3) and the corresponding distribution for the private
practices of public providers also first-order stochastically dominates that of their public
practices (Figure 4). Finally checklist completion is higher for public MBBS doctors than a
representative public provider (as would be expected given that the former are more qual-
ified), but it is lower for the public MBBS doctors even relative to a representative sample
of private providers (most of whom are unqualified, Figure 5).
Focusing on individual checklist items (Table A.5) shows that private providers in both
samples are significantly more likely to perform several items on the checklist on all three
cases, and are no less likely to perform any of the items. In addition to β1, Table 3 (columns
1-3) also shows that there is no correlation between the possession of any formal medical
qualification and checklist completion, suggesting that formal qualifications may be a poor
predictor of provider effort.
5.3 Diagnosis
Results for diagnosis (Table 4) follow the same format as Table 3 but the dependent variables
of interest are whether any diagnosis was given and whether a correct diagnosis was given
(both conditional and unconditional on uttering a diagnosis). In the representative sample,
26 percent of public providers offer a diagnosis, of whom only 15 percent offer a correct one.
The unconditional probability of a correct diagnosis was only 4 percent.
Private providers in the representative sample are more likely to offer a diagnosis but
are not more likely to offer a correct one. The probability of offering a correct diagnosis is
higher in the dual practice sample (15 percent vs. 4 percent), which is not surprising since
these providers are all trained MBBS doctors. Even among these doctors, however, there
is no difference in the rate of correct diagnosis between their public and private practices.
Overall, the summary statistics, our price regressions (seen later), and our field work suggest
that pronouncing a correct diagnosis (or even just a diagnosis) is not seen by providers (and
the market) as being essential in this setting.
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5.4 Treatment
Table 5 reports on several outcomes related to the treatment offered, coded as discussed in
section 3.3. The probability of receiving at least one correct treatment from a representative
public provider was 21 percent. However, they offered non-indicated treatments at much
higher rates, with a 53 percent probability of providing a palliative treatment, and a 74
percent probability of providing an unnecessary treatment. Since the majority of providers
provide unnecessary treatments, the probability of receiving only a correct treatment and
nothing more is 2.6 percent. We can also examine two potential proxies for over-treatment -
the rate of antibiotic prescriptions and the total number of medicines provided. Antibiotics
were prescribed or dispensed in 26 percent of interactions (though they were not indicated for
the asthma and angina cases), and an average of 2 medicines per interaction were dispensed.
In the representative sample, we do not find a significant difference between public and
private providers on the probability of providing a correct, palliative, or unnecessary treat-
ment; however, point estimates suggest that private providers have a higher probability of
providing both correct and unnecessary treatments. Private providers in the representative
sample also provide significantly more medicines (over 3 medicines on average, which is 30
percent greater than the public clinics).
In the dual practice sample, the rate of correct treatment is 36 percent higher (13.8 per-
centage points on a base of 38 percent), and the rate of antibiotic provision is 25 percent
lower (11.9 percentage points on a base of 48 percent) in the private relative to the pub-
lic practice of the same doctor. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls and
alternative definitions of correct treatment (see below).
5.5 Knowledge and Effort of Public and Private Providers
As predicted by the model, there is a strong correlation between higher provider effort and
probability of giving a correct treatment (Figure 6). Nevertheless, the results in Tables 3 and
5 suggest that even though the typical private provider exerts significantly greater effort than
his public counterpart, this greater effort does not lead to better treatment outcomes. The
most natural explanation for this is that the representative private provider has lower levels
of medical knowledge, but compensates with higher effort, yielding comparable overall levels
of treatment accuracy (in line with our theoretical framework). To examine this possibility
further, we use the ‘discrimination’ parameter of each checklist item (as estimated by the
IRT-model, see Table A.5), to classify the individual items into terciles of low, medium,
and high discrimination items. Here, higher discrimination items are those that are more
effective at distinguishing provider quality. In the model, these would correspond to questions
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and exams that enable a provider to construct a more precise posterior distribution (since
β = eK, this can be interpreted as a provider with more knowledge spending the effort more
efficiently).25
Table A.6 reports the same specifications as in Table 3 but compares public and private
providers on checklist completion for different levels of item discrimination. By construc-
tion, providers are much less likely to complete high discrimination items on the checklist
(consistent with low overall quality of care). In the representative sample, private providers
complete 11 percentage points more of the low-discrimination checklist items but are no
more likely to complete high-discrimination checklist items. However, in the dual sample
doctors are significantly more likely to complete both low and high-discrimination items in
their private practice. These results suggest that while the representative private provider
does exert more effort, lower knowledge implies that the marginal product of effort is high
only for questions that are easy to ask and interpret.
5.6 Robustness of checklist and treatment results
Our main results pool data across cases to maximize power. For completeness, we also
show the results from Tables 3-4 by case (Table A.7). The superior performance of private
providers on consultation length and checklist completion is seen in each of the three cases
and in both the representative and the dual samples. Consistent with the overall results,
private providers in the representative sample do not do better on diagnosis or treatment in
any of the individual cases. In the dual sample, MBBS doctors were 14 percentage points
more likely to correctly diagnose and 28 percentage points more likely to correctly treat the
unstable angina (heart attack) case in their private practice relative to their public practices.
In the asthma case, they are 11 percentage points more likely to offer a correct treatment
(but this is not statistically significant given the smaller case-specific sample size).
We confirm that the results in Table 4 are robust to alternative definitions of correct
treatment, such as treating all ‘referrals’ as a ‘correct’ treatment (Table A.8 shows the
specific treatments offered by case, including referral frequency; Table A.9 shows that the
results are robust to treating all referrals as a correct treatment). As discussed earlier, we
include the dysentery case for the analysis of checklist completion but exclude it from the
analysis of correct diagnosis and treatment because of the large (and differential) fraction of
cases where the provider did not provide these and instead asked to see the child (see Table
A.8). Since there is a possibility that the checklist completion may also be censored in such
25The classification of items into terciles of difficulty is done within each case, but the results are robust
to classifying the items jointly across all cases as well. The terciles for each individual item are indicated in
Table A.5.
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cases, we also present the checklist completion results without the dysentery case and the
results of Table 3 continue to hold (Table A.10). We also show the core results with controls
for clinic-level infrastructure and facilities (Table A.11), and all the results continue to hold,
suggesting that the results are not being driven by differences in facilities and infrastructure
across public and private clinics.
6 Results - Pricing and Cost Effectiveness
6.1 Correlates of Prices Charged among Private Providers
Table 6 presents correlations between prices charged and our various metrics of healthcare
quality in the representative sample, dual sample, and pooled samples. The odd columns
present binary correlations, while the even columns show the correlates of prices charged with
measures of quality in multiple regressions. The market rewards several measures of quality
of care including time spent, checklist completion rates, and provision of a correct treatment
(Table 6, Columns 1, 3 and 5). On the other hand, there is no price premium for pronouncing
a correct diagnosis and a price penalty for referrals; whether this penalty is optimal (without
a penalty, every provider should just refer the patient) or reduces provider incentives to refer
patients adequately is unclear. Finally, there is a price premium for dispensing medicines as
well as for the total number of medicines dispensed, which may provide incentives for the
provision of excessive medication and is consistent with our theoretical framework. Most of
these patterns are repeated in the multiple regressions (Table 6, Columns 2, 4 and 6). We
highlight that in multiple regressions, correct treatment is no longer rewarded. This is likely
due to the high correlation between the provision of a correct treatment and the checklist
completion rate (Figure 6) and the use of medicines. The market prices quality to the extent
it is embodied in the checklist, but patients cannot discern whether they received the correct
treatment conditioning on checklist completion.
The correlates of pricing observed in Table 6 are in line with those predicted by our
modeling framework and points to both strengths and weaknesses of market-based incentives
for healthcare provision. On one hand, there appear to be positive incentives for the provision
of better quality care (including more effort and providing the correct treatment). On the
other hand, the results are consistent with evidence from other settings, which show that
markets for credence goods with asymmetric information between providers and customers
often reward over-provision to the detriment of customer welfare. Overall, the results suggest
that the market rewards providers who “do more”, which is correlated with doing more
“good” things as well as more “unnecessary” things.26
26However, unlike the existing credence good literature, we are also able to observe over-provision in
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In sharp contrast to the market for private healthcare, the public sector rewards quali-
fications and age (experience), but there is no correlation between provider wages and any
of our measures of quality including the time spent, checklist completion, correct diagnosis,
or correct treatment (Table 7). Since public employees receive non-pecuniary rewards for
better performance through more desirable job postings, we also present correlations be-
tween the desirability of a posting and measures of quality and again find that the only
significant correlate of a better posting is age - suggesting that the public sector does not
reward the quality of care provided by doctors with either more pay or with more desirable
job postings.27
6.2 Comparative Cost Effectiveness
While healthcare in the public sector is free or nominally priced to the user, it is not cost-free
to the tax payer. Table A.13 presents estimates of the cost per patient in the public sector,
and calculates that the cost per patient interaction is around Rs.240. This is a conservative
calculation because it uses only the wage cost in the public sector and thus reflects cost
“at point of service” and does not include any cost of infrastructure, facilities, equipment,
medicines or administration. By contrast, the fees charged are the only source of revenue for
private providers, and hence will cover all operating costs. It also assumes that all patients
shown in the official records of the PHC/CHC were true patients. Finally, as is standard in
comparative cost effectiveness analysis of this sort, we assume that there is a comparable case
mix for primary-health visit across public and private facilities, which is consistent with our
data from observing real patients (see section 7.1 below) where we do not find any difference
in the symptoms presented across public and private clinics.
7 Robustness
7.1 Real Patients
While the use of SPs to measure quality of healthcare presents several advantages over the
next best method of clinical observations. However, SPs are limited in the number and types
of cases that can be presented. Further, we may worry that the audit methodology represents
the public sector and find that both public and private providers have similarly high levels of provision of
unnecessary treatments (Table 5).
27These results are similar to those found in publicly-provided education in India and Pakistan, where
teacher salaries increase with qualifications and seniority, but are not correlated with their effectiveness at
raising test scores (Muralidharan, 2013; Das and Bau, 2014). Note that the results are robust to excluding
observations where we were not able to identify the medicines provided and classify them as correct or not
(see Table A.12).
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“off equilibrium” situations in the market that do not extend to its general functioning.28 We
therefore supplemented our data collection after completing the SP modules by conducting
day-long observations in provider clinics to code actual provider-patient interactions. We
conducted these observations both in the representative and in the dual samples and observed
a provider in both his/her private and public practices. While we cannot code the accuracy of
the diagnosis and treatment from these observations since we do not observe the underlying
illness, we record several observable characteristics of each patient interaction based on over
1000 interactions in both samples.
Table 8 reports results from the specification adopted in equation 8 with data from real
patient interactions. Private providers spend more time with patients, ask more questions,
and are more likely to conduct a physical exam. They also give out more medicines on
average. Results from the dual sample are also remarkably similar to those in Tables 3-5,
with private providers still exhibiting higher effort but not providing more medicines. Thus,
while our SPs present only three specific cases, our results from observing real interactions
between patients and providers across the entire set of cases seen in a typical day are very
similar to those from the SPs, suggesting that our SP-based results may be valid for a wider
range of cases.
7.2 Strategic Diversion of Effort in the Dual Sample
One issue in interpreting the results from our dual sample is the possibility that doctors
with private practices may deliberately under-provide effort in their free public practices to
shift demand to their fee-for-service private practices (see Jayachandran (2014) for a similar
example from education). While we cannot fully rule out this possibility, there is suggestive
evidence against this. We compare public providers with and without a private practice
and find that providers with a private practice are not any more likely to refer away an SP
(Table A.14). We do find that providers with a dual practice provide less effort in their public
practices relative to those who do not, but the lack of any evidence of differences in referral
rates suggest that these differences may reflect selection rather than strategic behavior with
more publicly conscientious doctors being less likely to have a private practice.
The relevant policy question is whether doctors will start exerting more effort in their
public practice if the option of private practice did not exist. But it is worth noting that
private practice by public MBBS doctors was illegal in MP during the time of our study,
and that over 60 percent of providers still had a private practice, consistent with the idea
28Note that while the SP methodology allows us to compare the same cases across public and private
providers, it is possible that it may be off the equilibrium path for a patient with a serious condition to visit
one type of provider.
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that this is a low φ environment.
7.3 Alternative Comparisons in the Representative Sample
A final issue is that our representative sample analysis compares the average public and
private provider in a market, but it is not clear if the average is the correct metric for patient
choice since patients can choose the best provider in the market. We therefore present an
alternative comparison between the best public and best private provider (defined separately
for checklist completion and correct treatment) in each market in Table A.15 and find that
our results are very similar to those in Tables 3-5.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
Using an audit methodology, we present the first set of results on the quality of public and
privately provided healthcare in a low-income country that features a de facto unregulated
private sector. Comparisons of representative public and provider samples suggest that
patients in our setting have few good options for healthcare - public or private. Private
sector providers, the majority of whom have no formal medical training, spend more time
with patients and are more likely to adhere to a checklist of recommended case-specific
questions and examinations, but their effectiveness appears to be ultimately limited by their
low level of medical knowledge. Public sector clinics, though theoretically staffed by qualified
providers, are characterized by lower provider effort. Posts are vacant and doctors are
frequently absent, so that even in a public sector clinic, the patient often sees a provider
without formal training. The lower effort (compared to the private sector), appears to offset
the benefit of more qualified providers in the public sector, and ultimately there is little
difference in correct treatment or the overuse of incorrect medicines across a representative
sample of public and private providers. At least on the basis of these data, there is little
evidence that patients are harming their health more by going to the private relative to
the public sector, and the price paid could well reflect patient demand for provider effort
(including more reliable presence at the clinic).
Comparing the same provider in the public and private sector allow us to isolate the
effect of customer accountability in the private sector and compare it with administrative
accountability in the public sector. The first appears to perform better on all counts. Ad-
herence to checklists and correct treatment rates are higher in the provider’s private clinic,
and rates of incorrect treatments are identical in both sectors.
Better treatment according to medical guidelines is consistent with the hedonic price-
effort relationship in the private sector, which is absent in the public sector. Providers in the
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private sector earn more when they complete more of the medically necessary checklist and
when they provide a correct treatment, showing that the market rewards certain key aspects
of high quality. Where customer accountability fails is in its ability to control the extent of
unnecessary medication. Patients frequently receive treatments that they do not need, and
they pay for them. Surprisingly, however, the rate of provision of unnecessary medication is
equally high in the public clinics. Finally, our best estimates of cost per patient interaction
suggest that the public healthcare system in India spends at least four times more but does
not deliver better outcomes than the private sector.
Indian and global health policy debates have been hampered by a lack of empirical
evidence on the quality of clinical interactions in the public and private sector. Under the
status quo, considerable attention has been focused on inadequate access to publicly-provided
healthcare and the need to increase spending on the public healthcare system (Reddy et al.,
2011; Shiva Kumar et al., 2011; Planning Commission of India, 2013). Our results suggest
that enthusiasm for the public sector as the primary source of healthcare in resource poor
settings has to be tempered by the extent to which administrative accountability is enforced
in the system. More broadly, the quality of healthcare depends both on provider knowledge
and effort, and there are likely positive returns to investing in improved incentives for effort
in the public system of healthcare delivery (where providers are more qualified) or increased
training and credentialing among private healthcare providers, who have better incentives
for effort.29
Current policy thinking often points in the opposite direction, with a focus on hiring,
training, and capacity building in the public sector on one hand (without much attention to
their incentives for effort), and considerable resistance to training and providing legitimacy
to unqualified private providers on the other (Reddy et al., 2011; Shiva Kumar et al., 2011;
Planning Commission of India, 2013). This viewpoint is often justified by ad hoc assumptions
that patients - particularly those who are poor and illiterate - are unable to make accurate
decisions regarding their health care. While certainly possible, such an assertion would have
to be backed by empirical evidence on patient demand and quality of care. Our paper is
one of the first attempts to do so, and expanding this methodology to other conditions and
settings will allow for a richer understanding of the functioning of medical systems in settings
with low resources and administrative capacity.
29Our results should not necessarily be interpreted as recommending a fee-for-service model of compen-
sating healthcare providers to provide them with incentives for effort. There is considerable evidence from
the US that such a model can induce over-treatment (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014), which may be especially
undesirable in a low-income setting. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the status quo public health-
care system in India provides negative incentives to doctors for exerting effort, since greater effort is likely
to lead to an increased load of patients with no increase in compensation.
27
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Michael Kremer, and Atif Mian. 2008. “Incentives in Markets, Firms and Gov-
ernments.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 24(2): 273–306.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. “Uncertainty and The Welfare Economics of Medical Care.” American Economic
Review, 63(5): 941–973.
Ayres, Ian, and Peter Siegelman. 1995. “Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car.”
American Economic Review, 85(3): 304–21.
Baker, George. 1992. “Incentives Contracts and Performance Measurement.” Journal of Political Economy,
100: 598–614.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Wealth, Health, and Health Services in
Rural Rajasthan.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 94(2): 326–300.
Banerjee, Abhijit V, Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster. 2008. “Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse:
Incentives for Nurses in the Public Health Care System.” Journal of European Economic Association, 6(2-
3): 487–500.
Black, R E, S Cousens, H L Johnson, and et al. 2010. “Global, regional and national causes of child
mortality in 2008: a systematic analysis.” The Lancet, 375(9730): 1969–87.
Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffery Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey
Rogers. 2006. “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries.” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 20(1): 91–116.
Clemens, Joshua, and Jeffrey Gottlieb. 2014. “Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect Medical
Treatment and Patient Health?” American Economic Review, 104(4): 1320–49.
Coarasa, Jorge, Jishnu Das, and Elizabeth Gummerson. 2014. “Evaluating the Evidence on Public
and Private Sector Quality of Care in Low and Middle Income Countries.”
Cohen, Jessica, Pascaline Dupas, and Simone Schaner. 2015. “Price Subsidies, Diagnostic Tests, and
Targeting of Malaria Treatment.” American Economic Review, 105(2): 609–645.
CPR. 2011. “Mapping Medical Providers in Rural India: Four Key Trends.” Center For Policy Research.
Das, Jishnu, Ada Kwan, Ben Daniels, Srinath Satyanarayana, Ramnath Subbaraman, Sofi
Bergkvist, Ranendra K Das, Veena Das, and Madhukar Pai. 2015. “First use of the standardized
patient methodology to assess quality of Tuberculosis care.” Lancet Infections Diseases, , (forthcoming).
Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Veena Das, Manoj Mohanan, Diana Tabak, and Brian Chan. 2012.
“The Quality of Medical Care in Clinics: Evidence from a Standardized Patients Study in a Low-Income
Settting.” Health Affairs, 31(12): 2274–2784.
Das, Jishnu, and Jeffery Hammer. 2005. “Which Doctor? Combining Vignettes and Item Response
Theory to Measure Doctor Quality.” Jorunal of Development Economics, 78(3): 348–383.
Das, Jishnu, and Jeffery Hammer. 2007. “Money for Nothing: The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in
Delhi, India.” Journal of Development Economics, 83(1): 1–36.
Das, Jishnu, and Natalie Bau. 2014. “The Misallocation of Pay and Productivity in the Public Sector:
Evidence from the Labor Market for Teachers.” Working Paper.
DHS. 2007. “National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) 2005-2006: Key Findings.”
28
Dulleck, Uwe, and Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2006. “On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists:
The Economics of Credence Goods.” Journal of Economic Literature, 44: 5–42.
Dulleck, Uwe, Rudolf Kerschbamer, and Matthias Sutter. 2011. “The Economics of Credence Goods:
An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition.” American Economic
Review, 101(3): 526–555.
Faxon, David, and Claude Lenfant. 2001. “Timing is everything - motivating patients to call 911 on
onset of acute myocardial infarction.” Circulation, 104(11): 1210.
Foster, Andrew D, and Mark R Rosenzweig. 1994a. “Information, Learning, and Wage Rates in Rural
Labor Markets.” Journal of Human Resources, 28(4): 759–790.
Foster, Andrew D., and Mark R Rosenzweig. 1994b. “A Test for Moral Hazard in Labor Market:
Contractual Agreements, Reputation, and Competition.” American Economic Review, 101(3): 526–555.
Foster, Andrew D, and Mark R Rosenzweig. 1995. “Learning By Doing and Learning From Others:
Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture.” Journal of Political Economy, 103(6): 1176–1209.
Gertler, Paul J, and Christel Vermeersch. 2013. “Using Performance Incentives to Improve Medical
Care Productivity and Health Outcomes.” Working Paper.
Goldberg, Penelopi K. 1996. “Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey.” Journal of Political Economy, 104(3): 622–54.
Grepin, Karen. 2014. “The role of the private sector in delivering maternal and child health services in
low-income and middle-income countries: an observational, longitudinal analysis.” The Lancet, 387(S7).
Gruber, Jonathan, and Maria Owings. 1996. “Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section
Delivery.” RAND Jounal of Economics, 27(1): 99–123.
Hanna, Rema, and Iqbal Dhaliwal. 2015. “Making a Deal with the Devil: Experiental Evidence on
Bureaucratic Reform in India.” Working Paper.
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1991. “Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problems: Incentive Con-
tracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7(Special Is-
sue): 24–52.
Jayachandran, Seema. 2014. “Incentives to Teach Badly: After-School Tutoring in Developing Countries.”
Journal of Development Economics, 27(1): 99–123.
Jindal, S K, D Gupta, A N Aggarwal, and R Agarwal. 2005. “Guidelines for management of asthma
at primary and secondary levels of health care in India.” Indian J Chest Dis Allied Sci, 47(4): 308–343.
La Forgia, Gerrard, and Somil Nagpal. 2014. Government Sponsored Health Insurance in India: Are
You Covered? The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Leonard, Kenneth L, and Melkiory C Masatu. 2005. “The Use of Direct Clinical Observation and
Vignettes for Health Services Quality Evaluation in Developing Countries.” Social Science and Medicine,
61(9): 1944–1951.
Muralidharan, Karthik. 2013. “Priorities for Primary Education Policy in India’s 12th Five Year Plan.”
India Policy Forum 2012-13, 9: 1–46.
Muralidharan, Karthik, and Venkatesh Sundararaman. 2011. “Teacher Performance Pay: Experi-
mental Evidence from India.” Journal of Political Economy, 119(1): 39–77.
29
Muralidharan, Karthik, Nazmul Chudhury, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, and F Halsey
Rogers. 2011. “Is there a Doctor in the House? Absent Medical Providers in India.” Working Paper.
Norris, Pauline. 2002. “Reasons why mystery shopping is a useful and justifiable research method.” The
Pharmaceutical Journal, 272: 746–747.
Patel, V, S Chatterji, D Chisholm, and et al. 2011. “Chronic diseases and injuries in India.” The
Lancet, 377(9763): 413–428.
Pauly, Mark. 1980. Doctors and Their Workshops: Economic Models of Physician Behaviors. National
Bureau of Economic Research Monograph, Boston, MA.
Planning Commission of India. 2013. “Health, Nutrition and Family Welfare.”
Prendergast, Canice. 2003. “The Limits of Bureaucratic Inefficiency.” Journal of Political Economy,
111(5): 929–958.
Reddy, S K, Vikram Patel, Prabhat Jha, Vinod K Paul, A K Shiva Kumar, and Lalit Dandona.
2011. “Towards Achievement of Universal Health Care in India by 2020: A Call to Action.” The Lancet,
377(9767): 760–768.
Rethans, Jan-Joos, Ferd Sturmans, Riet Drop, Cees van der Vlueten, and Pie Hobus.
1991. “Does Competence of General Practitioners Predict Their Performance.” British Medical Journal,
303(6814): 1377–1380.
Rohde, Jon E, and Hema Viswanathan. 1995. The Rural Private Practitioner. Oxford University Press,
New Delhi.
Schneider, Henry S. 2012. “Agency Problems And Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto
Repair.” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 60(3): 406–433.
Selvaraj, S, and Anup K Karan. 2009. “Deepening Health Insecurity in India: Evidence from National
Sample Surveys since 1980s.” Economic and Political Weekly, 44(18): 55–60.
Shaban, Radwan Ali. 1987. “Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping.” Journal of Political
Economy, 95(5): 983–20.
Shiva Kumar, A K, Lincoln C Chen, Mita Choudhury, Shiban Ganju, Vijay Mahajan, Amarjeet
Sinha, and Abhijit Sen. 2011. “Financing Health Care for All: Challenges and Opportunities.” The
Lancet, 377(9766): 668–679.
Wagstaff, Adam. 2013. “What exactly is the public-private mix in health care?”
Wolinsky, A. 1993. “Competition in the Market for Informed Expert Services.” RAND Jounal of Economics,
24(3): 380–398.
World Bank. 2003. World Development Report 2004. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
30
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Optimal choice of effort and treatment with high and low  𝜙 with and without market incentives 
 
Notes: In panel (A), MBwith and MCwithout are the marginal benefit and the cost of 𝑒 with market incentives, and  MBwithout and MCwithout are 
those without market incentives. 𝑒with
∗  and 𝑒without
∗  are optimal levels of effort with and without market incentives for small and large 𝜙 values. 
In panel (B), The graph traces the posterior variance  
1
𝛼+𝛽
 with 𝑒 on the x-axis. The y-axis intercept  
1
𝛼
  is the posterior variance when 𝑒 = 0. In 
panel (C) and panel (D), MBwith and MCwithout are the marginal benefit and the cost of 𝑛 with market incentives, and  MBwithout and 
MCwithout are those without market incentives. 𝑛with
∗  and 𝑛without
∗  are optimal levels of treatment with and without market incentives for small 
and large 𝜙 values. Panel (C) and panel (D) compares the optimal level of treatment with and without market incentives when the posterior 
variance with market incentives is substantially smaller than that without market incentives and when the two posterior beliefs are similar. 
 
 
Figure 2: Health outcome with and without market incentives with varying 𝜙 
 
Notes: The graph illustrates the health outcome produced with and without market incentives with different values of 𝜙. The y-axis is the health 
outcome 𝐻 and x-axis is the magnitude of low-powered incentive, 𝜙. The solid line traces 𝐻 without market incentives and the dotted line 
traces 𝐻 with market incentives. 
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Total 11.68 3.97 7.71 16.02 4.65 11.37
(12.06) (4.49) (12.17) (15.81) (5.41) (16.42)
Public MBBS 0.45 0.05 0.40 0.50 0.02 0.48
(0.97) (0.22) (0.93) (1.11) (0.15) (1.11)
Public alternative qualification 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.17
(0.48) (0.29) (0.39) (0.52) (0.33) (0.44)
Public paramedical 1.58 1.13 0.45 1.98 1.30 0.67
(1.90) (1.46) (1.33) (2.12) (1.49) (1.59)
Public unqualified 1.71 0.68 1.03 2.07 0.67 1.39
(1.75) (1.04) (1.54) (2.05) (1.12) (1.94)
Total public 3.96 1.93 2.03 4.78 2.07 2.72
(3.20) (2.28) (2.63) (3.53) (2.45) (3.17)
Private MBBS 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.59 0.00 0.59
(1.57) (0.00) (1.57) (2.15) (0.00) (2.15)
Private alternative qualification 1.92 0.23 1.69 2.67 0.33 2.35
(3.65) (0.66) (3.65) (4.86) (0.90) (4.89)
Private unqualified 5.40 1.81 3.59 7.98 2.26 5.72
(6.01) (2.23) (6.14) (7.88) (2.74) (8.32)
Total private 7.72 2.04 5.68 11.24 2.59 8.65
(10.54) (2.69) (10.81) (14.31) (3.38) (14.87)
Fraction of households that visited a 
provider in last 30 days
0.46 0.58
(0.50) (0.49)
Fraction provider visits inside/outside village 0.66 0.34 0.69 0.31
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46)
Distance traveled to visited provider (km) 1.61 0.40 3.83 1.37 0.38 3.51
(2.14) (0.65) (2.14) (2.37) (1.16) (2.84)
Fraction of visits to MBBS doctor 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.06
(0.19) (0.09) (0.29) (0.13) (0.00) (0.23)
Fraction of visits to private sector 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.97 0.93
(0.31) (0.28) (0.36) (0.21) (0.18) (0.26)
Fraction of visits to private sector 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.91
(conditional on public availability) (0.33) (0.31) (0.38) (0.22) (0.20) (0.28)
Fraction of visits to private sector 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.93 0.98 0.90
(conditional on public MBBS availability) (0.37) (0.36) (0.41) (0.25) (0.15) (0.30)
Fraction of visits to unqualified providers 0.77 0.87 0.55 0.82 0.89 0.64
(0.42) (0.34) (0.50) (0.39) (0.31) (0.48)
Fraction of visits to unqualified providers 0.74 0.82 0.54 0.81 0.86 0.64
(conditional on public availability) (0.44) (0.38) (0.50) (0.39) (0.35) (0.48)
Fraction of visits to unqualified providers 0.60 0.77 0.38 0.66 0.81 0.39
(conditional on public MBBS availability) (0.49) (0.42) (0.48) (0.47) (0.39) (0.49)
Number of villages 100 46
Average village population 1,149 1,199
Average number of households per village 233 239
Number of reported provider visits 19,331 12,122
Average number of visits per household per 
month
0.83 1.10
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of providers available to a village was determined by a provider census, which surveyed all 
providers in all locations mentioned by households in 100 sample villages, when asked where they seek care for primary care services, regardless of whether 
or not the particular provider was mentioned by households. Unqualified providers report no medical training. All others have training that ranges from a 
correspondence course to a medical degree. "Outside villages" are typically adjacent villages or villages connected by a major road. The 30-day visit rate was 
calculated from visits to providers reported by households in a complete census of households in the 100 sample villages. The type of provider they visited 
was determined by matching reported providers to providers surveyed in the provider census.
Table 1: Health market attributes
Madhya Pradesh
(5 districts, 100 markets)
SP Sample Villages
(3 districts, 46 markets)
Panel A: Composition of markets based on census of providers
Panel B: Composition of demand from census of households in sampled villages
Panel C: Sample Characteristics from household census of provider choice













Panel A: Provider characteristics
Age of provider 46.92 43.51 0.10 44.52 44.74 44.43 0.89
Is male 0.86 0.96 0.02 0.87 0.96 0.84 0.10 0.84 0.85 0.87
More than 12 years of basic education 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.64 0.52 0.69 0.09
Has MBBS degree 0.25 0.07 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Has alternative medical degree 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
No medical training 0.61 0.68 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of practices 1.14 1.07 0.21 1.83 1.16 2.13 0.00
Tenure in years at current location 15.22 13.70 0.42 6.15 5.11 6.56 0.28
Panel B: Clinic characteristics
Dispense medicine 1.00 0.81 0.00
Consultation fee (Rs.) 3.65 51.24 0.00 3.75 3.15 3.92 0.00 3.92 57.93 0.00
Number of patients per day
(self reported in census)
28.06 15.74 0.00 31.85 31.30 35.00 0.74 35.00 17.59 0.07
Number of patients per day
(from physician observations)
5.72 5.75 0.98 16.04 13.72 16.86 0.31 16.86 5.63 0.00
Electricity 0.94 0.95 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Stethoscope 0.97 0.94 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Blood pressure cuff 0.83 0.75 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Thermometer 0.94 0.92 0.64 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.20 0.98 0.97 0.63
Weighing Scale 0.86 0.52 0.00 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.82 0.04
Handwash facility 0.89 0.81 0.30 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.93 0.85 0.81 0.56
Number of providers 36 188 103 31 72 72 84
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Unit of observation is a provider. The dual practice sample consists of providers who received a standardized patient in both their public and private practices. Provider 
mapping and complete provider census yielded information about whether or not a provider operates more than practice. The representative sample did not employ the intense reconnaisance to find both the public and 
private practices of the same provider, and thus the proportion of dual practice providers can be considered self-reported. In the dual practice sample, however, the existence of additional medical practices was verified 
by repeated observation. Alternative qualifications are as follows: BAMS, BIMS, BUMS, BHMS/DHMS, DHB, BEHMS, BEMS, B.Sc. Nursing/M.Sc. Nursing, B.Pharma/M.Pharma. In the public sector of the 
representative sample, there are 3 providers with BAMS and 1 with B.Pharma/M.Pharma. In the private sector, there are 21 with BAMS, 9 with BHMS/DHMS, 3 each with BIMS and DHB, 2 with 
B.Pharma/M.Pharma and 1 with BUMS. No medical training includes providers with RMP, other degrees (which could not be verified) and providers who self-reported no formal training. In the public sector of the 
representative sample, there are 22 with no formal qualifications, 4 with RMP and 1 who reported other degree. In the private sector, there are 128 with no formal qualfication, 46 with RMP and 10 who reported 
other degrees. Means for consultation fee were calculated from direct observations of clinical interactions. All other variables derive from a survey administered during the census of providers.
(5 districts) (5 districts)(3 districts)
Table 2: Characteristics of providers and practices where SPs were administered
Dual practice sampleRepresentative sample

















Is a private provider 1.222*** 6.758*** 0.512** 1.471*** 8.888*** 0.729***
(0.250) (2.488) (0.211) (0.267) (1.762) (0.178)
R-squared 0.305 0.160 0.237 0.219
Number of observations 662 662 233 331 331 138
Mean of public 2.388 15.287 1.562 17.677
Mean of private 3.703 22.302 2.965 28.223
Mean of sample 3.603 21.764 2.274 23.030
Is a private provider 1.486*** 7.352*** 0.608** 1.475*** 8.882*** 0.729***
(0.244) (1.948) (0.273) (0.259) (1.762) (0.180)
R-squared 0.391 0.259 0.258 0.233
Number of observations 662 662 233 331 331 138
Is a private provider 1.246*** 5.999** 0.500* 1.452*** 9.414*** 0.770***
(0.319) (2.338) (0.301) (0.268) (1.827) (0.190)
Has MBBS -0.156 3.285 0.043
(0.568) (2.940) (0.257)
Has some qualification -0.131 2.518 0.157
(0.299) (1.716) (0.151)
Age of provider -0.004 -0.046 0.000 0.005 -0.064 0.004
(0.012) (0.071) (0.008) (0.015) (0.102) (0.101)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 0.653 -0.949 0.212 -0.077 -1.383 -0.288
(0.544) (3.529) (0.327) (0.386) (2.639) (0.309)
Patient load during visit -0.096* -0.144 0.082** -0.106* -0.283 0.013
(0.052) (0.554) (0.040) (0.062) (0.424) (0.517)
R-squared 0.399 0.259 0.275 0.233
Number of observations 638 638 221 302 302 126
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. 
All regressions include a constant. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions, except in IRT score column where each 
observation is a provider. The score is computed using all cases, plausible values scores are used. Market fixed effects are used for the 
representative sample, and district fixed effects for dual practice sample. 
Table 3: Effort in the public and private sectors
Panel A: SP and case fixed effects
Representative sample Dual practice sample
Panel C: SP, case and market/district fixed effects





















Is a private provider 0.168*** -0.014 0.016 0.095 -0.050 0.018
(0.052) (0.057) (0.022) (0.068) (0.105) (0.053)
R-squared 0.130 0.121 0.075 0.130 0.114 0.054
Number of observations 440 178 440 201 88 201
Mean of public 0.263 0.150 0.039 0.380 0.395 0.150
Mean of private 0.431 0.135 0.058 0.495 0.380 0.188
Mean of sample 0.418 0.135 0.057 0.438 0.386 0.169
Is a private provider 0.188*** -0.019 0.023 0.089 -0.067 0.018
(0.072) (0.093) (0.031) (0.069) (0.109) (0.054)
R-squared 0.218 0.301 0.145 0.149 0.176 0.066
Number of observations 440 178 440 201 88 201
Is a private provider 0.149* -0.046 0.031 0.083 0.005 0.037
(0.081) (0.111) (0.035) (0.072) (0.122) (0.058)
Has MBBS -0.092 0.108 0.008
(0.093) (0.134) (0.039)
Has some qualification 0.023 -0.010 -0.012
(0.074) (0.075) (0.028)
Age of provider -0.002 -0.005* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
Gender of provider (1=Male) -0.089 0.272* 0.079* -0.125 -0.054 -0.086
(0.126) (0.145) (0.041) (0.109) (0.182) (0.079)
Patient load during visit -0.003 -0.017 -0.005 -0.018 -0.004 -0.005
(0.014) (0.011) (0.004) (0.018) (0.034) (0.013)
R-squared 0.222 0.362 0.159 0.185 0.217 0.096
Number of observations 423 173 423 183 80 183
Panel C: SP, case and market/district fixed effects
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All 
regressions include a constant. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions. Market fixed effects are used for the representative sample, 
and district fixed effects for dual practice sample. 
Representative sample Dual practice sample
Table 4: Diagnosis in the public and private sectors (unstable angina and asthma cases only)
Panel B: SP, case and market/district fixed effects
Panel A: SP and case fixed effects
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Is a private provider 0.052 -0.038 0.061 -0.008 0.016 0.972*** 0.138** -0.113* -0.014 0.018 -0.119* 0.064
(0.045) (0.056) (0.072) (0.023) (0.062) (0.279) (0.064) (0.061) (0.051) (0.025) (0.068) (0.182)
R-squared 0.260 0.215 0.066 0.044 0.079 0.087 0.270 0.306 0.107 0.025 0.114 0.128
Number of observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 201 201 201 201 201 201
Mean of public 0.211 0.526 0.737 0.026 0.263 2.092 0.380 0.630 0.830 0.020 0.480 2.800
Mean of private 0.270 0.496 0.808 0.017 0.279 3.097 0.554 0.475 0.842 0.040 0.386 2.950
Mean of sample 0.266 0.498 0.802 0.018 0.278 3.021 0.468 0.552 0.836 0.030 0.433 2.876
Is a private provider 0.051 0.040 0.095 -0.020 0.086 0.894*** 0.140** -0.116* -0.014 0.017 -0.121* 0.052
(0.059) (0.068) (0.070) (0.026) (0.069) (0.234) (0.064) (0.061) (0.050) (0.026) (0.068) (0.181)
R-squared 0.384 0.350 0.233 0.255 0.239 0.289 0.294 0.312 0.166 0.039 0.130 0.155
Number of observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 201 201 201 201 201 201
Is a private provider 0.101 0.060 0.066 -0.005 0.112 0.638** 0.160** -0.095 -0.014 0.017 -0.100 0.045
(0.071) (0.080) (0.075) (0.027) (0.080) (0.284) (0.068) (0.064) (0.057) (0.028) (0.071) (0.192)
Has MBBS 0.309*** 0.246** -0.132 0.106** 0.267*** -0.397
(0.087) (0.100) (0.089) (0.051) (0.086) (0.352)
Has some qualification 0.088 0.086 0.029 -0.001 0.099 -0.116
(0.057) (0.066) (0.054) (0.014) (0.063) (0.241)
Age of provider -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.012 -0.002 -0.007* 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.019*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 0.133 -0.118 -0.068 0.001 -0.029 -0.128 0.049 0.097 0.111 0.007 0.152 0.285
(0.098) (0.122) (0.091) (0.033) (0.132) (0.332) (0.100) (0.090) (0.081) (0.038) (0.100) (0.290)
Patient load during visit -0.008 -0.017 0.007 -0.001 -0.008 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.014 -0.004 0.002 0.076*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.045) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.003) (0.016) (0.040)
R-squared 0.406 0.370 0.253 0.278 0.272 0.293 0.273 0.316 0.180 0.053 0.159 0.180
Number of observations 423 423 423 423 423 423 183 183 183 183 183 183
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions. 
Market fixed effects are used for the representative sample, and district fixed effects for dual practice sample. In columns (6) and (12) the dependent variable is total number of medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or 
prescribed).
Table 5: Treatment in the public and private sectors
(unstable angina and asthma cases only)
Panel C: SP, case and market/district fixed effects
Panel A: SP and case fixed effects
Panel B: SP, case and market/district fixed effects
Representative sample Dual practice sample













Time spent with SP (minutes) 1.763*** 0.665 2.625*** 2.286*** 1.530*** 0.762*
(0.454) (0.467) (0.587) (0.685) (0.363) (0.390)
Percentage of checklist items 0.411*** 0.366*** 0.364*** 0.050 0.396*** 0.313***
(0.091) (0.097) (0.100) (0.128) (0.073) (0.089)
Correct diagnosis (unconditional) -3.749 -4.162** 7.504 5.534 3.026 1.985
(4.212) (1.922) (9.350) (9.022) (4.678) (4.113)
Correct treatment 7.065*** -0.985 7.744* 4.312 7.978*** 1.134
(1.789) (2.504) (4.145) (5.039) (1.895) (2.183)
Palliative treatment 8.036*** 3.618* 10.435** 7.376 7.890*** 4.399**
(2.056) (2.105) (4.242) (4.682) (1.807) (1.923)
Unnecessary treatment 14.039*** 0.970 14.973*** 5.149 14.283*** 3.241
(2.395) (2.878) (5.032) (6.214) (2.126) (2.532)
Dispensed medicines 17.643*** 18.552*** 16.118*** 14.176** 14.948*** 17.872***
(3.470) (1.601) (6.070) (5.692) (2.631) (1.750)
Number of medicines 5.198*** 0.897 5.863*** 2.664 4.989*** 0.380
(0.874) (1.058) (1.783) (2.837) (0.809) (1.128)
Referred/Asked to see child -19.161*** -9.762*** -9.882** -4.112 -16.737*** -11.350***
(4.115) (3.659) (4.763) (4.606) (3.366) (3.100)
Has MBBS 24.325*** 29.595*** 14.504*** 23.850***
(6.644) (8.185) (4.608) (4.275)
Has some qualification 4.444 6.077*** 2.317 6.819***
(3.276) (2.350) (2.930) (2.417)
Patient load during visit 0.736 0.640** -0.073 -0.281 0.402 0.240
(0.665) (0.315) (0.807) (0.817) (0.621) (0.534)
Age of provider -0.150 -0.075 0.267 0.251 -0.091 0.011
(0.144) (0.089) (0.239) (0.219) (0.119) (0.081)
Gender of provider (1=Male) -8.164** -4.668 -1.284 -3.976 -7.555*** -3.384
(3.497) (5.102) (4.882) (5.598) (2.924) (4.082)
Constant 5.524 -12.433 -0.785
(6.854) (12.367) (5.936)
R2 0.414 0.444 0.378
Number of observations 543 154 697
Mean price charged 27.460 32.740 28.627
SD 26.241 28.592 26.846
Table 6: Correlates of price charged (private interactions)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. Observations are 
standardized provider-patient interactions. Interpretation of coefficents in "Binary regressions" needs caution. Each coefficient represents a separate regression of prices 
on the row variable and SP, case and district fixed effects. Multiple regressions include SP, case and district fixed effects.  The covariate number of medicines includes 
all medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or prescribed).
Representative sample Dual practice sample Pooled sample
Fees in Rs.
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Percentage of checklist items 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009)
Time spent with SP (minutes) -0.049* -0.010 -0.056 -0.076
(0.025) (0.014) (0.073) (0.076)
Correct Treatment 0.011 -0.097** -0.268 -0.146
(0.059) (0.048) (0.235) (0.201)
Has MBBS 1.056*** 1.289***
(0.168) (0.175)
Has some qualification -0.094 0.851***
(0.367) (0.301)
Age of provider 0.011** 0.018*** 0.052*** 0.060**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.024)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 0.114 0.128 -0.580 -0.887
(0.188) (0.106) (0.509) (0.739)
Born in same district -0.384*** 0.020 -0.178 0.113
(0.146) (0.081) (0.444) (0.431)
Is a dual provider 0.578*** 0.145* 0.021 -0.169




Number of observations 302 183
Table 7: Wages in the public sector (public observations only)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level 
are in parenthesis. The desirability index is a constructed using principal component analysis of proximity to several amenities 
(paved road, bus stop, railway station, Internet, post-office and bank), availability of infrastructure (stethoscope, 
spyghamometer, torchlight, weighing scale, hand washing facility, drinking water, staff toilet, patient toilet, fridge, sterilizers, 
electric connection, electric supply, power generator, telephone, computer, IV drip, cots/beds, disposable syringes), and PHC 
size (number of staff and number of patients). In binary regressions columns, each coefficient represents a separate regression 
of prices on the row variable, a constant and district fixed effects. Multiple regressions include district fixed effects.






























Is a private provider 1.456*** 0.799*** 0.371*** -0.026** 0.500*** 1.894*** 1.154*** 0.143** -0.008 -0.021
(0.323) (0.180) (0.108) (0.011) (0.121) (0.569) (0.318) (0.063) (0.009) (0.134)
R-squared 0.054 0.030 0.103 0.003 0.017 0.115 0.082 0.017 0.001 0.000
Number of observations 1,137 1,137 1,133 1,138 1,138 1,085 1,083 1,082 1,090 1,090
Mean of public 2.378 2.994 0.473 0.994 2.319 1.499 3.284 0.678 0.991 3.190
Mean of private 3.833 3.793 0.844 0.968 2.819 3.393 4.439 0.821 0.983 3.169
Mean of sample 3.621 3.676 0.790 0.972 2.746 1.899 3.527 0.708 0.989 3.185
Number of public providers 29 29 29 29 29 51 51 51 51 51
Number of private providers 169 169 169 169 169 40 40 41 41 41
Is a private provider 1.192*** 0.615** 0.510*** 0.009 0.548*** 1.464*** 0.494*** 0.080** -0.016 -0.014
(0.325) (0.248) (0.086) (0.014) (0.150) (0.300) (0.128) (0.039) (0.012) (0.098)
Has MBBS degree -0.427 0.416* 0.155** -0.024 -0.336
(0.516) (0.227) (0.079) (0.015) (0.211)
Has some qualification 0.349 0.021 0.004 -0.034** -0.157
(0.388) (0.143) (0.050) (0.015) (0.139)
Age of Provider -0.027** 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.004 -0.011** -0.001 -0.000 -0.014***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004)
Gender of Provider (1=Male) -1.433** -0.780 0.016 0.006 -0.116 -0.362* 0.056 -0.102* 0.008 -0.017
(0.688) (0.756) (0.087) (0.019) (0.203) (0.202) (0.203) (0.054) (0.015) (0.139)
R-squared 0.295 0.331 0.368 0.113 0.309 0.167 0.354 0.195 0.051 0.180
Number of observations 835 835 833 835 835 812 811 810 813 813
Panel A: no patient controls or fixed effects
Panel B: including patient controls and market/district fixed effects
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Observations are patient-provider interactions, and the sample has 
been limited to the SP sample. All regressions include controls for patients' characteristics and patients' presenting symptoms. Controls for patients' characteristics include: whether patient has no education, 
number of questions asked by patient, and patients' asset index. Controls for patients' presenting symptoms include: number of days patient has been sick, patients' ease in performing activities of daily living, and 
indicators for a number of presenting symptoms (fever, cold, diarrhea, weakness, injury, vomiting, dermatological problem, pregnancy, and pain). In columns (5) and (10) the dependent variable is total number 
of medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or prescribed).
Table 8: Real patients in the public and private sectors
Representative sample Dual sample
A Mapping and Sampling of Providers
A.1 Mapping of Providers: Representative Sample
We first randomly selected five districts in the state of Madhya Pradesh, stratified by region
and an index of health outcomes. In each district, we sampled 20 villages by probability
proportional to size (PPS) sampling. Because of the rural focus of the study, we restricted
the sampling frame to villages with population below 5,000. The sample of villages is thus
representative of rural Madhya Pradesh.
In each sampled villages, we conducted at least three Participatory Resource Assessments
in different locations within the village and obtained a list of all the health care providers that
households’ sought primary care services from. These lists were used primarily to identify
the geographical locations that households’ sought care from. For instance, households may
seek care from providers within the village, but also on the nearest highway. If 5 percent
or more households reported visiting a provider in an outside location, we identified that
location as a “cluster village” and considered it a part of the “health care market” for the
sampled village. Fifty-five sampled villages have one cluster village, 13 villages have two,
and one village has three. The remaining 31 villages have no cluster villages (i.e. less than 5
percent of primary health care visits were to a location outside the village). For our sample
as a whole, we identified 184 unique locations, including the 100 sampled villages.
Surveyors then visited each location and administered a provider census to all health care
providers in the location - regardless of whether they had been mentioned in the participatory
assessments. The provider census details the provider’s demographic, practice and clinic
characteristics.
Following the provider census in the villages, we administered a short household census
with information on household demographics and health care seeking behavior. For each
household member, we asked about incidence of any illness (primary or otherwise) in the
past one month, if they sought medical attention for that illness, and (if yes), the name and
address of the provider they visited (regardless of the location of the provider). Surveyors
mapped the household visits to the providers lists; this is the mapping we use to compute the
fraction of visits to public and private providers and providers with different qualifications
in the text. In instances where households reported visiting providers not already on the
list, we probed for providers’ name, address and practice details and added the providers
to our listing and census exercise. We verified through this exercise that we had covered
at least 95 percent of all providers visited by households in each village. This exhaustive
mapping process ensured that we mapped the complete “health market" where households
in our sampled villages sought primary care services.
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A.2 Sampling of Providers for SP visits: Representative Sample
We conducted the SP work in three out of the five districts in our sample because of logistic
considerations. Although SPs were recruited from the local community, they needed plausible
reasons for their presence in the village (which they were not from), and the typical narrative
was that they were traveling and/or passing by the village. In order to minimize SP detection,
we excluded 5 remote markets (as assessed by road access) from the possible 60 markets,
where we thought a traveling excuse might not be plausible.
We sampled providers for the SP work from a smaller set of “eligible providers” than
what we had mapped. All public nurses and midwives (ANMs), community health workers
(ASHA), day-care center workers (Anganwadi), chemists and pharmacists as ineligible for
SP work, as they provided primarily preventive care such as vaccinations. We also exclude
mobile and itinerant providers from the sample. Finally, we exclude 55 providers with
whom we could not complete the provider census (typically due to the unavailability of
provider, we were able to conduct the census with 17 of these providers in subsequent rounds).
These restrictions remove 7 markets from our study, primarily because there were no eligible
providers in these markets. We also drop two other markets because they share a cluster
with other sampled villages and do not have eligible providers inside the village. Our study
in the representative sample therefore covers 46 markets in 3 districts of Madhya Pradesh
(see Table A.1). Based on the eligibility criteria defined above, these 46 markets have 649
eligible providers (130 public and 519 private) from which we sample.
In each market we randomly sampled up to two eligible providers in each public clinic
and up to six private providers in each market.30 In the private sector, we sampled one
provider per clinic. We sampled a total of 247 providers of which 45 are public providers
and 202 are private providers (Appendix Table A.1). We also sampled all MBBS providers
in both public and private sectors.
A.3 Completion of SPs: Representative Sample
We sampled 247 providers in 235 clinics and SPs were completed with 224 providers in 215
clinics. Of these, 214 providers are those we sampled. Furthermore, for 27 SP interactions
(corresponding to 10 providers) we saw a provider who had not been sampled. We knew the
identity of the provider because he/she had been included in the census, but was practicing
in a clinic different from their own. For 18 observations (corresponding to 8 public and 2
private clinics and 10 public and 2 private provider sampled) we do not know the identity
30One market in Gwalior district was an exception to this rule. In the cluster village of a particular market,
we found 113 providers. In this market, we relaxed our sampling protocol and sampled 20 private providers.
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of the provider. These were most likely staff mapped to the clinic who are not licensed to
provider care, but do so when the doctor is absent.
The discrepancy between who we sampled and who we actually saw does not affect
interpretation of our results in Panels A and B of Tables 3-5 but it does in Panels C.
Panels A and B present results without provider controls, therefore, whether or not we have
background data on the provider is not relevant. Including the small fraction of observations
where we saw unintended and unknown providers, the public-private difference here should
be interpreted as the difference random visits to providers’ clinics than providers. In Panels
C, we present results including provider controls. Here, for 27 interactions where we saw
providers we did not sample but mapped (and conducted provider census), we use their
background information. The 18 observations where we do not know the provider at all are
dropped from the estimation sample.
A.4 Mapping of Providers: Dual Practice Sample
We obtained a list of all Primary Health Centers (PHCs) and Community Health Centers
(CHCs) from the Ministry of Health of Madhya Pradesh. Excluding PHCs/CHCs which
were mapped as part of the representative sample, we mapped 200 more facilities in this
round. Of these 200 facilities, 40 did not have a MBBS provider posted (see Appendix Table
A.2). In the remaining 160 PHCs/CHCs we located 216 providers (some providers were
mapped to multiple facilities). Our field team then undertook detailed field work to find out
if these providers operated private practices and if yes, to locate their private practices. We
found thatwere able to locate a private practice for 132 of the 216 providers (61.1 percent)
operated a private practice (this is the sample we call the “dual practice sample”.). After
the mapping, we administered the provider census to all providers. To the extent possible,
the census was administered in the private clinic of the provider.
A.5 Sampling of Providers: Dual Practice Sample
We sampled one provider from every PHC/CHC with preference for a dual practice provider.
Often a provider is posted to multiple public facilities, and in cases where there were no
additional providers in these facilities, we randomly sampled the provider from one of the
multiple facilities they were posted to. With this sampling strategy, we sampled from 143
of the 160 facilities we could have sampled from. Of the 143 providers, 94 operated private
practices (65.7 percent, see Table A.2).
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A.6 Completion of SPs
We completed SPs with 118 of the 143 providers sampled, primarily because providers had
left the clinic or were away on “long leave” in the 6-month phase between the listing and
the SP work. We attempted to complete these providers over a minimum of 4 attempts, and
were forced to stop trying at that point due to the heightened risk of detection. Of the 49
providers without private facilities, we completed an SP with 30 providers (61.2 percent).
Of the 94 providers with private practices, we were able to complete at least one SP with
88 providers (93.6 percent, either public or private). The number of dual practice providers
for whom we have at least one observation in both public and private is 69. As discussed
in text, and seen in Table A.10, it was difficult to complete a case in the public practice of
the public MBBS doctors (because of high absence rates), and we had a lower completion
rate in the public practices of these doctors than in the private practices (75 percent versus
93 percent). To the extent that absence is correlated with lower quality practice, this would
suggest that we underestimate the public-private difference in our results.
B Standardized Patient Data Collection and Notes
B.1 Description of tracer conditions and relevance for India
SPs presented either a case of unstable angina, asthma, or dysentery of an absent child.
• Unstable Angina: A 45-year-old male complains of chest pain the previous night.
Appropriate history taking would reveal classic signs (radiating, crushing pain) and
risk factors (smoking, untreated diabetes, and family history of cardiac illness) of
unstable angina or an imminent myocardial infarction.
• Asthma: A 25-year-old male or female presents with difficulty breathing the night
before the visit. When questioned appropriately, the SP reveals that the episode lasted
for 10 to 15 minutes and involved a “whistling” sound (wheezing) and that he or she
has had similar episodes before, often triggered by house cleaning and cooking smoke.
The SP also reports a family history of similar symptoms.
• Dysentery: A 26-year-old father of a 2-year-old complains that his or her child has
diarrhea and requests medicines. When probed, the SP reveals details of their water
source and sanitation habits, in addition to the presence of fever and the frequency
and quality of the child’s stools.
For all cases, checklists of recommended history questions and examinations were de-
veloped together with an advisory committee and SPs were trained to recall the questions
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asked and examinations performed. These were then recorded during debriefing with the
supervisor using a structured questionnaire within an hour of the interaction. In a recent
study, we test the reliability of recall by comparing audio recordings with recall and find a
very high correlation of 0.63 (p<.001) (Das et al., 2015).
B.2 Relevance of Cases
Incidence of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases has been increasing, and diarrheal disease
kills more than 200,000 children per year in India (Black et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2011)
The Indian government’s National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) has developed triage,
management, and treatment protocols for unstable angina, asthma, and dysentery in public
clinics, suggesting clear guidelines for patients presenting with any of these conditions (Jindal
et al., 2005). The cases were also chosen to minimize risk to standardized patients since
they could not portray any symptoms of infection given the documented high propensity to
administer medicines intravenously with unsterilized needles and to use thermometers that
have not been appropriately disinfected (Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004).
B.3 SP recruitment, script development and SP training
A total of 22 SPs were recruited from an initial group of 45 who were extensively screened
and trained for 3 weeks. The age and sex of recruited SPs corresponded to the relevant
tracer conditions. For instance, angina was depicted by male SPs between 40 and 50 years
old.
Scripts were developed under the guidance of an anthropologist with active SP partici-
pation that described the social and family contexts of the patient if a provider were to ask
questions about these details. Script development and SP training jointly ensured that the
clinical symptoms and case history reflected the social and cultural milieu of which the SP
was assumed to be a member and, second, the presentation of symptoms and answers to
history were consistent with biomedical facts about the disease. SPs were trained to present
symptoms and answer questions pertaining to case history that were medically correct. For
example all opening statements and questions pertaining to the type of cough and its du-
ration were standardized. SPs were also trained to distinguish between questions to which
answers could be improvised but had to be appropriate to the social role of the SP and
answers that had to be given using local idioms but in a standardized format without any
alterations.
All SPs underwent rigorous training for 100-150 hours that started with a focus on the
cases and the development of scripts and proceeded to memorization and appropriate role-
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playing, as well as techniques to perfect recall of the questions asked and examinations
completed during the interaction. Following the training, SPs visited doctors who were
working with our team to provide feedback on their presentation and depiction of the cases.
Finally, dry runs were completed with unannounced visits to consented providers to help
build the confidence of the SPs and take them through a number of “real-life" situations.
Field work started once protocols were in place for the variety of these experiences.
The study was first piloted in Delhi with 64 consented providers who had been previously
informed that they would be visited by an SP within the next 6 months (see Das et al. (2012)).
In the pilot phase of the study, a total of 248 out of a potential 256 SP interactions were
completed. Within a month of the SP visit, field-workers visited the consented providers
to enquire if they had been visited by an SP. In cases where the provider felt that an SP
visit had occurred, we elicited the sex, approximate age and symptoms of the SP. We could
confirm a match between the providers’ suspicions and the actual SP sent to the provider in
only 2 cases for a detection rate of less than 1 percent.
Institutional review boards at Harvard University and Innovations for Poverty Action
and the Central and State governments in India granted clearance for the study. For the
Delhi pilot, consenting providers were informed they would receive a standardized patient
in the following 6 months. No standardized patients were harmed or exposed to risk in this
stage and detection rates among consented providers were below 1 percent. To minimize
detection in rural Madhya Pradesh, where providers are more likely to recognize their entire
patient population, the study proceeded as an audit, and providers were not aware that they
were being visited by standardized patients. Clearance was granted for this deception design
because the risks to providers and their patients were minimal, whereas accurate measures
of provider practice were nonexistent. The expected length of clinical interactions, patient
loads, and levels of provider anxiety induced by the cases were thought to be small, and
standardized patients had to pay providers whatever they charged. The waiver of consent
is consistent with the principle that where the research subject provides a public service to
other customers, the public have a right to know about the quality of the service provided
(Norris, 2002).
B.4 Categorizing treatment in SP interactions
In rural Madhya Pradesh, as in much of India, providers often dispense medicines in the
clinic rather than prescribe them for purchase from external chemists (some do both). Our
field staff recorded names of all dispensed/prescribed medicines in SP exit interviews and
used multiple resources to classify medicines as accurately as possible. Field staff were
given a list of commonly used drugs in India along with their medical classification, and the
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CIMS Drug Information System (in print), which they used to record exact medicine names
and classes. For drugs that were not immediately confirmed, they consulted local chemists
and pharmacists and obtained correct names to the extent possible. Along with names,
field staff coded if the medicines belonged to any of the following categories âĂŞ ayurvedic,
homeopathic, antibiotics, analgesics, anti-ulcer medication, steroids, anti-allergy medicines,
cardiac medicines, psychiatric medicines, other.
To construct our main treatment variables - correct treatment, palliative treatment and
unnecessary treatment - we obtained from a panel of doctors in the United States and
India a full list of correct and palliative treatments/medicines for each case. These include
nitrates, aspirin, clopidogrel, anti-platelet agents, blood thinners, beta blocker, morphine,
other pain control, ACE inhibitor and vasodilator for unstable angina; ORS, electrolytes
and zinc for asthma; and inhaled-corticosteroids, leukotriene inhibitors, cromones, inhaled-
anticholinergics and oral-corticosteroids for asthma (see Table A4).
After medicine coding in the field, members of the ISERDD team in Delhi verified the
codes assigned to all medicines and recoded if them when necessary. To further ensure the
coding was correct, we used a third party, a pharmaceutical consulting firm in Delhi, to
independently verify our classification of medicines.
Medicine coding is relatively straightforward in instances where providers prescribe and
SPs receive a written prescription. In cases where providers dispense, it is obviously easier
to obtain names when medicines come with packaging than when they do not. In the 1,123
complete SP interactions, SPs were recommended a total of 2,772 medicines corresponding
to 969 unique medicines (by medicine names, ignoring unlabeled ones). We are unable
to classify 14.18 percent of the all 2,772 medicines because they were unlabeled (providers
dispensed them as loose samples or in crushed powder form). We are further unable to classify
3.64 percent of medicines (93 unique medicines by name) because we could not match them
to secondary information sources. SPs received at least one unclassifiable medicine in 268
interactions (23.9 percent). However, in 211 of these interactions (18.8 percent), SPs received
classifiable medicines along with the unclassifiable medicines. In only 57 interactions (5.1
percent) were all medicines unclassifiable.
We construct our main treatment variables - correct treatment, palliative treatment and
unnecessary treatment - after completing the medicine coding process described above. For
each interaction, we determine if any recommended medicines fall into correct, palliative
and/or unnecessary treatments, treating all unlabeled and unidentifiable medicines as un-
necessary. It is possible that the unlabeled and unidentifiable medicines construe correct or
palliative treatment. But our results are robust to excluding interactions that include un-
classifiable medicines. Nonetheless, the likelihood that the provider dispenses medicines, and
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the provider dispenses an unclassifiable medicine is decreasing in other measures of provider
quality from the SP study, therefore we are reasonably confident that such medicines are
more likely unnecessary treatments than not.
C Theoretical Appendix
We provide a simple theoretical framework which demonstrates doctors’ choice of effort
and treatment with and without market incentives as well as the effects of their choices
on patient’s health outcome. This framework incorporates three possible channels which
can generate excessive unnecessary treatments. The first channel is ignorance. Doctors
want to treat patients, but they do not know the cause of patient’s symptoms and give
out a cocktail of medicines hoping that one of the medicines would work. Second, there
is pecuniary incentive to sell more medicines. Third, excessive treatment can be driven by
patients. Patients have their own expectation about proper treatment, and doctors satisfy
the patients by complying their expectation.
One key intuition of the framework is that unnecessary treatments are not only driven
by market incentives but also can arise due to low effort of doctors. When doctors lack
motivation to exert enough effort to substantially reduce their ignorance about the patients
condition, mixing a variety of treatment is even necessary to maximize the health outcome.
Market incentives induce higher effort but also lead to more unnecessary treatment at any
given level of effort, thus, health outcome produced under market system does not necessarily
dominate that of public system, and vice versa.
Our purpose is to provide a framework which helps to interpret the empirical findings
related to the choice of effort and treatment by doctors facing different incentives. We
abstract from any market equilibrium component such as pricing, entry and exit decisions of
doctors, or any strategic interaction among doctors in the market or across sectors (public
and private). Patients’ expectation also enters exogenously rather than endogenously formed
in the market.
This appendix is comprised of two parts. In section 1, which is the main part of the
appendix, we introduce doctors’ utility maximization problems and discuss whether market
incentives induce higher effort and better health outcome. We first omit the patients’ expec-
tation channel from the problem to focus on the effects of market incentives and introduce
it again at the end of the section. In section 2, we provide one potential way of endogenizing
the market incentives for interested readers.
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C.1 Doctors’ maximization problem with and without market incentives
A patient visits a doctor endowed with a level of medical knowledge K. The patient has
an illness defined by the required type of treatment denoted by ntrue. Patients with differ-
ent underlying illnesses may experience similar symptoms. In other words, given a set of
symptoms, there is a distribution of ntrue associated with the symptoms. Doctors’ job is to
identify the true state of the patient and perform adequate treatments. The doctor-patient
transaction is modeled as a two-stage process: consultation and treatment. Subscript i for
ith doctor is used when there is a need to emphasize heterogeneity among doctors. The
subscript is suppressed otherwise for notational simplicity.
C.1.1 Consultation stage
A patient visits a doctor. The true state of the patient ntrue is unobserved to both the
patient and the doctor. The patient describes his symptoms, and the doctor forms a prior








The prior belief can be thought of the distribution of illnesses in the region which cause
the given symptoms. The doctor exerts a costly effort e to learn about ntrue. The effort cost
is given by e2. One can interpret e as the number of checklist items or time spent with the
patient. e is also observed by the patient. The doctor draws a noisy signal s ∼ N(ntrue, 1
β
)
by exerting e where β = eK. The signal is not observed by the patient. Given s, the doctor
updates her belief about ntrue. The posterior belief of the true state is given by:
npost ∼ N






This is the result of standard Bayesian normal updating, and hence, proof is omitted. Note
that npost → ntrue as β →∞.
C.1.2 Treatment stage
Based on the posterior belief about the true state, the doctor decides the types of treatment
she will perform. The treatment is expressed as an interval [µ−n, µ+n], and n is interpreted
as the variety of the treatment chosen by the doctor. Let Fe denote the cumulative density
function of the posterior belief given some level of effort e. Given K, the shape of the
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posterior belief is governed by e. Throughout the appendix, e and β are used interchangeably
depending on the context. The probability that the interval [µ − n, µ + n] includes ntrue is
denoted by Pe(n) where Pe(n) = Fe(µ + n) − Fe(µ − n). There is a health cost of using a
variety of treatment given by n2. The expected health outcome, H, is a function of e and
n and is given by H(e, n) = Pe(n) − n2. Note that for each individual patient, the interval
either includes the true state or not with probability of Pe(n) and 1− Pe(n).
The patient has his own belief about the proper treatment that he expects to receive
when visiting a clinic given the symptoms he has, which is denoted by n¯. It is assumed that
n¯ is also known to the doctor. When the chosen n is different from n¯, the doctor needs to
communicate with the patient to convince him that the doctor’s choice of n is the correct
treatment. The farther away n is from n¯, the more communication needs to be done. Also,
the patient is more easily convinced if the doctor has exerted more effort to examine the
patient in the first place. The cost of communication is given by (n−n¯)2
e
. An easy way to
reduce this communication cost is to simply give something close to n¯. We are particularly
interested in the case where n¯ is large.
C.1.3 Doctors’ optimization problem with and without market incentives
Denote the maximized utility of doctors in the consultation stage and treatment stage by V1
and V2 respectively. Without market incentives, doctors have low-powered incentives only














where φ governs the magnitude of low-powered incentives.
Doctors may face market incentives in addition to low-powered incentives. In market
environment, doctor i charges a piece rate τi per unit of effort as a consultation fee and also
charges p per unit of n for the treatment.31 Doctors also care about their reputation in the
market, which is determined by the health outcome of their patients. Health outcome is not
fully observed in the market because the long-term health cost of excessive treatment is not as
easily observed as the immediate relief of the symptoms. Instead, reputation is based on the
observed health outcome Ho, which is given by Ho(e, n) = Pe(n)− γon2 where 0 < γo < 1. δ
is a parameter that governs the magnitude doctors care about their reputation in the market.
When there are market incentives, doctors maximize their utility given by:
31Charging a per-unit fee per effort is reasonable and widespread phenomenon in the Indian context. We

















To focus on how the presence of market incentives shape the optimal choices of doctors
when there are some degrees of ignorance, let us omit the third channel, expectation of
the patients, and remove the term − (n−n¯)2
e
from the doctor’s maximization problem. We
reintroduce the term in subsection 1.5.





fe(µ+ n) = n (12)
where fe is the probability density function of the posterior belief given e. fe(µ + n) cap-
tures the marginal benefit of increasing n through higher probability of covering the correct
treatment. The left hand side is the marginal cost of increasing n through higher health cost
of excessive treatment. Note that doctors choose n which maximizes H at any given e.
The first order condition in the consultation stage with market incentives is given by:




and the first order condition in the treatment stage is given by:
fe(µ+ n) +
p






The pecuniary benefit of selling n increases the marginal benefit of n. Because γo < 1, the
marginal cost of n is smaller than when there are no market incentives.
It is easy to see from (12) and (14) that given e, doctors choose larger n when there are
market incentives. Because there is pecuniary benefit from n and also because the cost of
excessive n is not fully observed in the market, given e, the marginal benefit of n is always
greater and the marginal cost is always smaller than those without market incentives. Thus,
doctors choose excessive n where H is decreasing in n instead of where H is maximized.
This means that by slightly decreasing n, the health outcome will be improved.
Whether market incentives induce higher effort depends the relative size of the rewards
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for e and n in the market. As long as the rewards for n is not too large so as to dominate
those for e, doctors choose higher e with market incentives. One of the benefits of exerting
higher e is to produce better health outcome with smaller n. When there is little punishment
for excessive treatment in the market and the marginal profit from treatment is large, doctors
may find it optimal to reduce e and profit from large n unless the direct rewards for effort
are large enough to offset the force. To see this from the first order conditions (11) and (13),
observe that the marginal benefit of e is larger when there are market incentives if n(e) were
the same for both with and without market incentives. However, doctors choose larger n
when there are market incentives. Note that, for any given e, nfe(µ + n) is increasing in n
when n < 1√
α+β
, maximized when n = 1√
α+β
, and decreasing in n when n > 1√
α+β
. Also,
nfe(µ + n) is bounded below by 0 and above by 1√2pi exp{−12}. Let n1(e) and n0(e) denote
the optimal choice of treatment as a function of given e with and without market incentives.
Observe that when n1(e) < 1√
α+β
, the marginal benefit of e with market incentives is always
greater than that without market incentives. n1(e) is more likely to be smaller than 1√
α+β
when the market incentives for n are small, i.e., when p is small and Ho is close to H. On
the other hand, when n1(e) > 1√
α+β
, the left hand side of (11) may be larger than that of
(13). However, because nfe(µ + n) is bounded, we can always τ which makes the marginal
benefit of e with market incentives larger.
C.1.4 Market incentives and health outcome
The direction of the effects of market incentives on the level of effort and health outcome
depends on parameter values. One possible outcome of the model is that, when the mag-
nitude of low-powered incentives, φ, is small, the health outcome under market incentives
dominates; however, as φ increases, the health outcome without market incentives starts to
dominate.32
Figure 3 and 4 in the main text illustrate the mechanism that such outcome is produced.
Panel (A) in Figure 3 illustrates a case where market incentives induce higher effort. MBwith
andMBwithout are the left hand side of (20) and (11) with respect to e. MCwith andMCwithout
are the right hand side of (20) and (11) with respect to e. Holding other parameter values
32Although we do not provide a formal proof, we confirmed in numerical simulations that there exists a
set of parameter values with which the model produces the outcome consistent with the argument provided
here. There are three conditions on parameter values for the model to produce such outcome: (1) τ and
γe, the parameters that govern rewards for effort in the market, are large enough so that doctors exert high
effort even when φ is small; (2) K is large enough so that exerting extra effort is meaningfully translated
into higher posterior precision; (3) p and γo, the parameters that govern the size of market incentives for
excessive treatment, are large enough to induce excessive treatment even when φ becomes high, but also
small enough not to entirely offset the effect of market rewards for higher effort. The simulation results are
available upon request.
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constant, MB and MC curves with some small and large φ values are drawn. e∗with and
e∗without are the optimal levels of effort with and without market incentives, respectively, for
small and large φ values. The rewards for higher effort in the market is sufficiently large in
this case, e∗with is larger than e∗without. With larger φ the optimal choice of e is higher.
Panel (B) has posterior variance 1
α+β , the inverse of posterior precision, as a function of
e holding K constant. The y-axis intercept 1
α
is the posterior variance when e = 0. 1
α+β
decreases with e at diminishing rates because β = eK. When φ is small, a difference in e
is translated into a substantial difference in the posterior variance. When φ is large, the
marginal effect of effort on 1
α+β is small.
Panel (C) illustrates the optimal level of treatment with and without market incentives,
n∗with and n∗without, when the posterior variance with market incentives is substantially smaller
than that without market incentives. MBwith and MBwithout are the left hand side of (21)
and (12) with respect to n. MCwith and MCwithout are the right hand side of (21) and
(12) with respect to n. The slope of MCwith is smaller than 1 because the health cost of
excessive treatment is not fully observed, and hence, punishment for excessive treatment in
the market is weaker than what doctors would impose on themselves due to low-powered
incentives. p, the unit price of n, is added toMBwith, soMBwith asymptotes to p2(φ+δ) rather
than to 0. When posterior variance with market incentives is substantially smaller than that
without incentives, the optimal level of n with market incentives can be smaller in spite of
incentives for excessive treatment. Panel (D) illustrates the optimal level of treatment with
and without market incentives, n∗with and n∗without, when the posterior variance with market
incentives is only slightly smaller than that without market incentives. In this case, the
effects of market incentives on excessive treatment dominates, and the optimal level of n is
larger with market incentives.
Figure 4 illustrates the health outcome produced with and without market incentives
with different values of φ. H increases with φ because e increases with φ, and n is invariant
of φ given e when there are no market incentives and decreases with φ when there are market
incentives. We argue that, when φ is low, H is higher with market incentives; however, as
φ increases, H without market incentives starts to dominate that with market incentives.
When φ is very small, doctors choose e close to zero without other incentive to exert effort.
With market incentives, doctors always choose e that is above τ . At low levels of e, small
difference in e is translated into a substantial difference in the posterior precision. Although
market incentives induce excessive n, the effect of higher posterior precision on the health
outcome dominates the offsetting effect of excessive n. However, as φ increases, e under both
environment increases, and the effect of e on the posterior precision, and hence on the health
outcome, becomes smaller. At sufficiently high levels of e, higher e with market incentives
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generates little difference in the posterior precision that is too small to offset the effect of
excessive n. Thus, when φ is high, the health outcome without market incentives is higher.
C.1.5 Re-introducing the patient’s expectation
When patients have their own expectation about proper treatment, doctors engage in costly
communication to convince patients that their choice of n is the correct treatment. The first
order conditions with the communication cost , (n(e)−n¯)2
e
, are given below.
















With market incentives :

















eφ+ eδ n¯ (16)
Note that, in the treatment stage, the marginal cost of n is smaller than that when
patients’ expectation channel is omitted when n < n¯ and it is larger when n > n¯. Thus,
there is an incentive to choose n closer to n¯. Figure ?? illustrates the effect of some large n¯
in the treatment stage. We consider a case where doctors choose higher effort with market
incentives. Panel (A) is when the patient’s expectation channel is omitted and panel (B)
is when the channel exists. In panel (A), MBwith and MBwithout are the left hand sides of
(14) and (12) with respect to n. MCwith and MCwithout are the right hand sides of (14) and
(12) with respect to n. In panel (B) they are the left and the right hand sides of (16) and
(15). The optimal levels of treatment with and without market incentives are labeled as




eφ+eδ and − 1eφ < − 1eφ+eδ ; the MC curve with
market incentive has a higher intercept and a smaller slope. The direction of inequalities
still holds when e with market incentives is larger than that without market incentives. At
small values of n, MC of n is lower in panel (B) than in (A) because the communication
cost decreases as n becomes closer to n¯. Thus, with some large n¯, the optimal choice of n
becomes larger. The effect is larger when there are no market incentives because the level
of effort is lower, and hence, the communication cost of deviating from n¯ is greater. This
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implies that when patients demand excessive treatment and doctors lack incentives to exert
effort without market incentives, we would observe more excessive treatment among public
doctors.
C.2 Endogenous market incentives
In this section, we provide a set of assumptions about market structure and patients’ prefer-
ence that generate market incentives consistent with (10). By allowing the current piece-rate
consultation fee τ to depend on the past realizations of the level of e and Ho, we derive the
same set of optimality conditions for e and n as in the previous section. The distinction
between τ and γe becomes clear by specifying the dynamic pricing equation.
The structure of the economy is similar to the one considered by (Acemoglu, Kremer
and Mian, 2008) where teachers produce noisy signal about their ability (test score of their
students) by choosing the level of productive and unproductive efforts and the price of each
teacher is determined where the parents’ expected utility from any teacher becomes zero.
Because different price is set for each doctor, different levels of effort and treatment and
resulting health outcomes are sustained in the market. We abstract from entry and exit
decisions of doctors and assume away any strategic interaction among doctors.
Consider an infinite horizon economy with infinitely lived doctors and patients who live
for one period. In every period, a new set of patients enter the economy. Suppose that there
is a finite and countable set of symptoms and each patient experience a subset of symptoms.
For example, chronic headache can be one subset and chest pain be another, and also, the
union of chronic headache and chest pain can be another subset. Furthermore, suppose
that separate markets exist for each subset of symptoms and there is no interaction between
markets. Each market has N doctors and a continuum of patients of measure one. The
measure of the patients is constant over time. Each patient can visit only one doctor.
In the market, doctors face dynamic market incentives in addition to low-powered incen-
tives. Denote the piece rate τ in this period and the next period by τ0 and τ1 respectively.
Their choice of e and n in this period affects τ1 through a law of motion given by τ1 = τ(Hoi ).
Doctors discount the future with discount factor δ, 0 < δ < 1. The doctors’ present value of


















The first order condition in the consultation stage with market incentives is given by:
τ0 − 2e+ ∂V2
∂e
= 0








where e(τ1) is the optimal choice of e given τ1 and ∂V1∂τ1 = e(τ1) comes from the envelope







































+ 2(1− γo)n = 2fe(µ+ n)− 2γon.
Patients derive utility from the health outcome, the doctor’s effort, and treatment. Pa-
tients do not observe the true health outcome H and base their utility on the observed health
outcome Ho. Patients believe that higher doctor efforts will lead to better health outcome.
Patients’ expected utility of visiting doctor i in period t is given by:
EUi,t = Hoi,t + γnni,t − τi,tei,t − ni,tp
with γn > 0 where γn captures the pure consumption value of a unit of n. The utility patients
derive from the effectiveness of n is embedded in Ho.
We make the following three assumptions about the market.
Assumption 1. Treatment can be purchased outside the doctor’s clinic. For example,
there are pharmacies where patients can purchase medicines. There is infinitely many sup-
pliers of treatment and the quality of a unit of n is homogenous. The suppliers are price
takers.
Assumption 2. Doctors are price takers.
Assumption 3. The economy is in the steady state where each doctor makes the same
choice of ei,t = ei,t−1 and ni,t = ni,t−1 ∀t.
Under Assumption 1, Bertrand competition among patients imply that p = γn. Thus,
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EUi,t = Hoi,t−τi,tei,t. The added value of a doctor visit comes from identifying effective treat-
ment through consultation but not from consuming n itself. With Assumption 2, Bertrand
competition among patients lead to τi,t at which EUi,t = 0 for all i in every t. Assumption 3
implies that the expected observed health outcome in period t is the same as that in period







. As a result, patients
are indifferent over all doctors, and each doctor sees a continuum of patients of measure 1
N
every period.
The timing of the events is the following:
1. In the beginning of period t, a new set of patients enter the market.




3. Given τt,i for all i, patients choose a doctor they want to visit.
4. Each doctor chooses their optimal ei,t and ni,t. Note that although a draw of signal s
is different for each patient, and so is the posterior mean, the choice of ni,t is the same
for all patients.
5. At the end of the period, Hoi,t and ei,t for all i is revealed. From the law of large
numbers, Hoi,t is observed without an error.
6. The current set of patients exit the market.
7. Period t+ 1 begins, and the same sequence of events repeat.



























= −τ ∗ + fe(µ+ n(e∗)) n(e
∗)K√
α + e∗K
where τ ∗is a steady state piece rate for a given doctor and e∗ and n∗ are the optimal choices.
Rewriting the first order conditions with market incentives by plugging the above expressions
in (18) and (19), we have:





Figure 1: Optimal choice of treatment with and without patient’s expectation n¯
Notes: The graphs illustrate the effect of large n¯ when the effort with market incentives is larger
than when without. Panel (A) is when the patient’s expectation term is omitted and panel (B)
is when it is not. MBwith and MBwithout are the graphs of the left hand side of (21) and (12)
with respect to n. MCwith and MCwithout are the graphs of the right hand side of (21) and (12)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Public Private Total Public Private
Total eligible 60 719 144 575 51 23 28
Markets selected for SP 46 649 130 519 50 23 27
Reasons for not sampling market
Remote market 5
No eligible provider 7
Common cluster market, no provider within village 2
Sampled for SPs 247 45 202 28 12 16
Not sampled for SPs 14 472 99 373 23 11 12
Completed SPs 46 224 36 188 23 9 14
Public Sector
At least 1 public provider sampled 22 151 36 115 20 9 11
At least 1 public provider completed 20 141 36 105 20 9 11
At least 1 public MBBS provider sampled 10 98 21 77 18 8 10
At least 1 public MBBS provider completed 9 87 19 68 18 9 9
Private Sector
At least 1 private provider sampled 44 218 30 188 22 8 14
At least 1 private provider completed 44 218 30 188 22 8 14
At least 1 private MBBS provider sampled 8 68 5 63 16 2 14
At least 1 private MBBS provider completed 7 67 5 62 16 2 14
Private and Public Sector
Markets with at least 1 public and 1 private provider sampled 20 145 30 115 19 8 11
Markets with at least 1 public and 1 private provider completed 18 135 30 105 19 8 11
Number of MBBS providers
Table A.1: Sampling and completion of SPs in the representative sample
(Number of providers with whom SPs were completed)
Notes: In 5 markets where SP work was over completed, the SP saw a provider other than a sampled provider
Panel B: Sampling and completion by sector
















Total 200 Total 216
without doctors 40 20.0% without private facilities 84 38.9%
with doctors 160 80.0% with private facilities 132 61.1%
Panel B: Sampling
Total 143 Total 143
without private facilities 49 34.3%
with private facilties 94 65.7%
Total 102 Total 118
without private facilities 30 25.4%
with private facilities 88 74.6%
Table A.2: Mapping, sampling and completion in the dual practice sample
ProvidersFacilities
Panel C: Completed (at least one case)
Notes: Reasons for not completing SP surveys include transferred and provider not found. In almost all cases our field staff made at least three 
attempts to complete a case. During fieldwork we replaced five sampled providers with other providers. In two cases, it was because the provider 



























Is private 1.497*** 13.190*** 0.181 0.077 0.131 -0.230** -0.017 0.302 9.109**
(0.483) (3.292) (0.118) (0.099) (0.113) (0.117) (0.075) (0.241) (4.119)
Received Unstable Angina in private 0.433 5.441 0.100 0.075 -0.194 -0.079 0.094 0.205 -0.862
(0.518) (3.534) (0.127) (0.106) (0.121) (0.126) (0.080) (0.255) (4.356)
(Is private) x 
(Received Unstable Angina in private)
0.143 -2.996 -0.214 -0.094 0.044 0.131 -0.051 0.268 -0.604
(0.719) (4.898) (0.176) (0.147) (0.168) (0.174) (0.111) (0.354) (6.053)
Constant 1.644*** 13.687*** 0.307*** 0.150** 0.639*** 0.487*** 0.873*** 0.783*** 17.088***
(0.347) (2.367) (0.085) (0.071) (0.081) (0.084) (0.054) (0.172) (2.941)
Table A.3: Randomization balance for dual sample providers' assignment of Unstable Angina cases
Asthma outcomes Dysentery outcomes




Unstable angina Asthma Dysentery
History questions where is the pain, when started, 
severity of pain, radiation, previous 
similar, since when, shortness of 
breath, sweating, beedi-cigarette, 
family history
current breathing probes, cough, 
expectoration probes, previous 
breathing problems, since when 
problems, shortness constant of 
episodic, what triggers, fever, chest 
pain, weight loss, beedi-cigarette, 
family history
age of child, qualities of school, 
frequency, quantity of stool, 
urination, child active/playful, fever, 
abdominal pain, vomitting, source 
of water, what has child eaten, child 
taking fluids
Examinations pulse, bp, auscultation (front or 
back), temperature attempt, ecg 
in/outside clinic
pulse, bp, auscultation (front or 
back), temperature attempt
Correct   Heart attack, angina, myocardial 
infarction, attack
Asthma, asthma attack Dysentery, bacteria
Incorrect   Blood pressure problem, 
gastrointestinal problem, muscle 
problem, the weather, injury, nerve 
pull, lack of blood, swelling in chest, 
pain from drinking cold water, 
heavy work, bad blood, decaying 
lungs, chest congestion
Blood pressure problem, 
gastrointensinal problem, heart 
problem, the weather, cough in 
chest, thyroid problem, weakness, 
lack of blood, infection in windpipe, 
pregnancy, allergy
Weather, heat in liver, acidity, 
diarrhea
Correct   Aspirin, clopidogrel/other anti-
platelet agents, do an ECG. 
Bronchodilators, theophylline, 
inhaled or oral corticosteroids, 
leukotriene inhibitors, cromones, 
inhaled anticholinergics
ORS, rehydration
Palliative Nitroglycerin, blood thinners, 
betablockers, ACE inhibitors, 
vasodilators, other cardiac 
medication, morphine, other pain 
medication, referral or referral for 
an ECG.
Anti-allergy medication Antibiotics,zinc
Unncessary or harmful Antibiotics, oral rehydration salts, 
oral electrolyte solution, zinc, 
steroids, inhaler, bronchodilators, 
theophylline, inhaled corticosteroids, 
leukotriene inhibitors, cromones, 
inhaled anti-cholinergics, oral cortico-
steroids, other anti-asthmatic 
medication, anti-allergy medication, 
psychiatric medication. 
Aspirin, clopidogrel, anti-platelet 
agents, blood thinners, betablockers, 
ACE inhibitors, vasodilators, other 
cardiac medication, morphine, other 
pain medication, oral rehydration 
salts, oral electrolyte solution, zinc, 
antibiotics, anti-ulcer  medication,  
psychiatric medication
Aspirin, clopidogrel, anti-platelet 
agents, blood thinners, betablockers, 
ACE inhibitors, vasodilators, other 
cardiac medication, morphine, other 
pain medication, steroids, inhaler, 
bronchodilators, theophylline, 
inhaled corticosteroids, leukotriene 
inhibitors, cromones, inhaled anti-
cholinergics, oral cortico-steroids, 
other anti-asthmatic medication, anti-
allergy medication, psychiatric 
medication
Notes: See Appendix B for coding of treatments
Table A.4: Checklist items, diagnoses and treatments
Panel B: Diagnosis
Panel C: Treatment











Panel A: Unstable Angina
History questions
where is the pain high 0.659 0.486 0.694 0.208*** 0.582 0.528 0.645 0.117
when started low 0.369 0.270 0.389 0.119* 0.149 0.167 0.129 -0.038
doing when began high 0.074 0.054 0.078 0.024 0.119 0.083 0.161 0.078
severity of pain low 0.258 0.162 0.278 0.116* 0.284 0.167 0.419 0.253**
radiation high 0.143 0.108 0.150 0.042 0.299 0.222 0.387 0.165*
previous similar medium 0.392 0.270 0.417 0.146** 0.328 0.278 0.387 0.109
since when low 0.263 0.216 0.272 0.056 0.209 0.111 0.323 0.211**
quality of pain high 0.115 0.108 0.117 0.009 0.179 0.111 0.258 0.147*
pain changes low 0.060 0.054 0.061 0.007 0.104 0.056 0.161 0.106*
shortness of breath medium 0.138 0.081 0.150 0.069 0.045 0.056 0.032 -0.023
nausea medium 0.295 0.297 0.294 -0.003 0.209 0.056 0.387 0.332***
sweating high 0.290 0.270 0.294 0.024 0.313 0.194 0.452 0.257**
beedi-cigarette low 0.069 0.054 0.072 0.018 0.134 0.083 0.194 0.110*
family history high 0.014 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.045 0.000 0.097 0.097**
Examination questions
pulse low 0.392 0.243 0.422 0.179** 0.537 0.417 0.677 0.261**
bp medium 0.313 0.135 0.350 0.215*** 0.373 0.222 0.548 0.326***
auscultation (either front or back) low 0.447 0.189 0.500 0.311*** 0.522 0.444 0.613 0.168*
temperature attempt medium 0.134 0.108 0.139 0.031 0.134 0.028 0.258 0.230***
ecg in/outside clinic medium 0.230 0.243 0.228 -0.015 0.313 0.278 0.355 0.077
Number of observations 217 37 180 67 36 31
Panel B: Asthma
History questions
current breathing probes medium 0.601 0.385 0.647 0.262*** 0.552 0.422 0.671 0.250***
cough low 0.677 0.590 0.696 0.106 0.575 0.453 0.686 0.233***
expectoration probes low 0.148 0.077 0.163 0.086* 0.045 0.016 0.071 0.056*
previous breathing problems high 0.439 0.333 0.462 0.129* 0.410 0.266 0.543 0.277***
previous episode probes medium 0.184 0.128 0.196 0.067 0.201 0.109 0.286 0.176***
since when problems medium 0.475 0.385 0.495 0.110 0.328 0.234 0.414 0.180**
how often happens high 0.108 0.128 0.103 -0.025 0.067 0.047 0.086 0.039
shortness constant or episodic low 0.103 0.051 0.114 0.063 0.090 0.047 0.129 0.082**
what triggers medium 0.117 0.077 0.125 0.048 0.164 0.094 0.229 0.135**
how long lasts high 0.067 0.077 0.065 -0.012 0.052 0.016 0.086 0.070**
childhood illness medium 0.027 0.000 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.016 0.043 0.027
age high 0.170 0.308 0.141 -0.166*** 0.537 0.578 0.500 -0.078
fever low 0.309 0.231 0.326 0.095 0.306 0.219 0.386 0.167**
chest pain low 0.336 0.154 0.375 0.221*** 0.231 0.172 0.286 0.114*
weight loss high 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.016 0.014 -0.001
night sweats high 0.054 0.051 0.054 0.003 0.067 0.047 0.086 0.039
beedi-cigarette high 0.018 0.026 0.016 -0.009 0.045 0.016 0.071 0.056*
family history medium 0.022 0.000 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.031 0.043 0.012
Examination questions
pulse low 0.502 0.256 0.554 0.298*** 0.388 0.313 0.457 0.145**
bp medium 0.278 0.205 0.293 0.088 0.239 0.109 0.357 0.248***
auscultation (either front or back) low 0.516 0.333 0.554 0.221*** 0.649 0.484 0.800 0.316***
temp attempt low 0.166 0.103 0.179 0.077 0.082 0.063 0.100 0.038
Number of observations 223 39 184 134 64 70
(continued on next page)
Table A.5: List of checklist items used in the treatment of SPs















age of child low 0.919 0.795 0.945 0.150*** 0.930 0.921 0.939 0.019
qualities of stool low 0.167 0.077 0.186 0.109** 0.271 0.159 0.379 0.220***
frequency medium 0.288 0.179 0.311 0.132** 0.372 0.270 0.470 0.200***
quantity of stool high 0.050 0.000 0.060 0.060* 0.031 0.016 0.045 0.030
urination high 0.018 0.000 0.022 0.022 0.008 0.016 0.000 -0.016
active/playful high 0.032 0.026 0.033 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
fever medium 0.171 0.077 0.191 0.114** 0.295 0.222 0.364 0.141**
abdominal pain low 0.113 0.077 0.120 0.043 0.256 0.222 0.288 0.066
vomiting low 0.216 0.077 0.246 0.169*** 0.295 0.254 0.333 0.079
source of water high 0.023 0.000 0.027 0.027 0.016 0.000 0.030 0.030*
what has eaten medium 0.050 0.000 0.060 0.060* 0.093 0.032 0.152 0.120***
taking fluids medium 0.023 0.000 0.027 0.027 0.062 0.048 0.076 0.028
























Is a private provider 10.982*** 7.085** 1.760 10.519*** 11.745*** 5.122***
(3.281) (2.875) (2.143) (2.404) (2.360) (1.746)
R-squared 0.144 0.175 0.238 0.279 0.236 0.318
Number of observations 662 662 662 330 330 330
Mean of public 21.770 13.975 10.197 28.254 14.592 10.020
Mean of private 32.966 21.322 12.235 41.104 28.800 15.234
Mean of sample 32.108 20.759 12.079 34.756 21.782 12.659
Is a private provider 11.290*** 8.597*** 1.594 10.594*** 11.709*** 5.077***
(2.609) (2.535) (1.969) (2.358) (2.381) (1.751)
R-squared 0.253 0.256 0.300 0.301 0.247 0.322
Number of observations 662 662 662 330 330 330
Is a private provider 8.538*** 7.317** 1.657 11.786*** 12.518*** 4.523**
(3.030) (3.092) (2.381) (2.480) (2.466) (1.794)
Has MBBS 2.548 5.175 2.307
(3.949) (3.449) (2.916)
Has some qualification 2.300 4.764* 0.721
(2.563) (2.447) (1.831)
Age of provider -0.151 -0.009 0.044 -0.069 -0.135 -0.042
(0.102) (0.094) (0.077) (0.139) (0.138) (0.101)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 1.009 -1.353 -2.369 2.773 -2.792 -3.651
(4.541) (5.383) (3.361) (3.586) (3.565) (2.593)
Patient load during visit -0.041 -0.396 0.050 -0.501 -0.203 -0.211
(0.736) (0.557) (0.528) (0.576) (0.572) (0.416)
R-squared 0.254 0.262 0.301 0.290 0.252 0.330
Number of observations 638 638 638 301 301 301
Table A.6: Effort in the public and private sectors by checklist item discrimination terciles
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. Observations 
are standardized provider-patient interactions. Checklist item discrimination parameters are estimated using the IRT methodology. The classification of items 
into terciles of difficulty is done within each case, but the results are robust to classifying the items jointly across all cases. Market fixed effects are used for the 
representative sample, and district fixed effects for dual practice sample. 
Outcome variable: Percentage of recommended type of checklist items
Representative sample Dual practice sample
Panel A: SP and case fixed effects
Panel B: SP, case and market/district fixed effects
Panel C: SP, case and market/district fixed effects
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Is a private provider 1.101*** 7.890** 0.112 0.033 0.011 0.021 -0.070 0.083 -0.026 0.024 0.782***
(0.303) (3.418) (0.093) (0.074) (0.030) (0.034) (0.081) (0.083) (0.028) (0.062) (0.286)
R-squared 0.083 0.138 0.016 0.155 0.082 0.033 0.021 0.056 0.016 0.030 0.043
Number of observations 217 217 217 102 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
Mean of public 2.592 17.354 0.378 0.071 0.027 0.027 0.784 0.730 0.027 0.135 2.054
Is a private provider 3.232*** 12.856** 0.214** 0.164 0.142* 0.281*** -0.004 0.061 -0.013 0.490
(1.012) (5.367) (0.109) (0.153) (0.076) (0.093) (0.079) (0.124) (0.112) (0.356)
R-squared 0.214 0.105 0.349 0.141 0.153 0.179 0.062 0.055 0.070 0.181
Number of observations 61 61 61 29 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Mean of public 1.986 18.586 0.375 0.083 0.031 0.031 0.906 0.656 0.000 0.250 2.188
Is a private provider 1.952*** 6.015** 0.224*** -0.123 0.021 0.082 -0.008 0.040 0.010 0.009 1.158***
(0.475) (2.940) (0.071) (0.201) (0.043) (0.094) (0.081) (0.085) (0.034) (0.094) (0.301)
R-squared 0.200 0.172 0.209 0.065 0.067 0.043 0.029 0.076 0.038 0.019 0.095
Number of observations 223 223 223 76 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
Mean of public 3.301 17.716 0.154 0.333 0.051 0.385 0.282 0.744 0.026 0.385 2.128
Is a private provider 1.418*** 12.167*** 0.033 -0.078 -0.015 0.107 -0.136 -0.049 0.023 -0.151* -0.169
(0.374) (2.545) (0.092) (0.158) (0.080) (0.089) (0.089) (0.056) (0.043) (0.092) (0.224)
R-squared 0.201 0.235 0.090 0.102 0.060 0.127 0.107 0.110 0.043 0.097 0.119
Number of observations 122 122 122 51 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Mean of public 1.872 15.831 0.379 0.545 0.207 0.534 0.448 0.914 0.034 0.586 3.086
Is a private provider 0.846*** 7.088***
(0.231) (2.052)
R-squared 0.091 0.108
Number of observations 222 222
Mean of public 1.281 10.897
Is a private provider 0.395** 5.279**
(0.181) (2.569)
R-squared 0.095 0.340
Number of observations 119 119
Mean of public 0.879 16.228
Treatment
Table A.7: Effort, diagnosis and treatment by case
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant and controls for provider qualifications, age, gender, and 
patient load. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions. In column (11) the dependent variable is total number of medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or prescribed).
Panel C2: Dysentery, dual practice sample, with SP fixed effects
Panel C1: Dysentery, representative sample, with SP fixed effects
Effort
Panel B1: Asthma, representative sample, with SP fixed effects
Panel B2: Asthma, dual practice sample, with SP fixed effects
Diagnosis
Panel A1: Unstable angina, representative sample, with SP fixed effects











Panel A: Unstable Angina
Correct treatment 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.26***
Correct treatment (alternate) 0.46 0.37 -0.09 0.42 0.61 0.20*
Palliative treatment 0.78 0.71 -0.07 0.92 0.90 -0.01
Unnecessary treatment 0.73 0.80 0.07 0.67 0.74 0.08
Aspirin 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.20***
Anti-platelet agents 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03
Referred 0.30 0.24 -0.05 0.22 0.32 0.10
ECG 0.24 0.23 -0.02 0.28 0.35 0.08
ECG & Referred 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.08
Antibiotic 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.28 0.23 -0.05
Number of observations 37 180 36 31
Panel B: Asthma
Correct treatment 0.38 0.50 0.12* 0.58 0.67 0.09
Palliative treatment 0.28 0.29 0.01 0.47 0.29 -0.18**
Unnecessary treatment 0.74 0.83 0.09* 0.92 0.89 -0.04
Bronchodilators 0.33 0.36 0.03 0.52 0.59 0.07
Theophylline 0.13 0.22 0.09* 0.31 0.31 0.00
Oral Corticosteroids 0.15 0.31 0.16** 0.16 0.24 0.09
Antibiotic 0.38 0.40 0.02 0.59 0.46 -0.14*
Number of observations 39 184 64 70
Panel C: Dysentery
Correct treatment 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.33 0.22 -0.11*
Palliative treatment 0.44 0.61 0.18** 0.75 0.61 -0.13*
Unnecessary treatment 0.28 0.56 0.28*** 0.35 0.40 0.05
ORS 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.33 0.21 -0.12*
Asked to see child 0.33 0.14 -0.20*** 0.27 0.42 0.15**
Antibiotic 0.44 0.61 0.18** 0.75 0.61 -0.13*
Number of observations 39 183 63 67
Representative sample Dual practice sample
Notes: In Unstable Angina, alternate definition for correct treatment codes referrals and referrals for ECG as correct.  Note the large and 
significnat differences in "asked to see the child" across public and private providers in the representative and dual samples. If we were to 
assume the same rate of correct treatment in these cases, then the differences in correct treatment are no longer significant in either sample.  
If we carry out a bounding exercise, the differences are still not significant, and the standard errors are too wide for meaningful inference. 
This is why exclude the dysentery case in our pooled analysis of treatment across cases. 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Representative sample Dual practice sample Representative sample Dual sample
Correct treatment Correct treatment Correct treatment Correct treatment
Is a private provider -0.014 0.119* -0.112 0.206*
(0.063) (0.069) (0.088) (0.121)
R-squared 0.075 0.086 0.092 0.070
Number of observations 440 201 217 67
Mean of public 0.421 0.520 0.459 0.417
Mean of private 0.421 0.653 0.360 0.613
Mean of sample 0.421 0.587 0.367 0.507
Is a private provider 0.001 0.122* -0.065 0.195*
(0.069) (0.070) (0.118) (0.115)
R-squared 0.196 0.095 0.298 0.186
Number of observations 440 201 217 67
Is a private provider -0.009 0.126* -0.203 0.190
(0.070) (0.075) (0.141) (0.122)
Has MBBS 0.340*** 0.233
(0.081) (0.147)
Has some qualification 0.164*** 0.139
(0.057) (0.095)
Age of provider 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 0.256 0.007 0.334** -0.165
(0.158) (0.111) (0.170) (0.162)
Patient load during visit -0.030*** -0.006 -0.022** -0.034
(0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.021)
R-squared 0.244 0.106 0.352 0.240
Number of observations 423 183 208 61
Panel A: SP fixed effects
Panel C: SP and market/district fixed effects
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant. 
Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions. Columns (1) and (2) also include case fixed effects. Market fixed effects are used for the representative sample, and 
district fixed effects for dual practice sample.  Alternative definition for Unstable Angina adds "referral" and "referral for ECG" as correct treatment.
Table A.9: Robustness of treatment results with alternative definition for correct treatment for unstable angina
All (compare with table 4) Unstable angina only (compare with table A8)
Panel B: SP and market/district fixed effects
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Is a private provider 1.531*** 6.942** 0.519** 2.200*** 12.267*** 0.687***
(0.306) (3.307) (0.209) (0.419) (2.376) (0.194)
R-squared 0.225 0.152 0.170 0.154
Number of observations 440 440 233 201 201 138
Mean of public 2.956 17.540 1.970 17.481
Mean of private 4.548 24.335 4.043 30.196
Mean of sample 4.427 23.820 3.011 23.870
Is a private provider 1.907*** 7.593*** 0.629** 2.201*** 12.271*** 0.682***
(0.367) (2.727) (0.275) (0.406) (2.392) (0.194)
R-squared 0.341 0.278 0.194 0.164
Number of observations 440 440 233 201 201
Is a private provider 1.654*** 6.087* 0.543* 2.061*** 12.243*** 0.729***
(0.481) (3.354) (0.299) (0.421) (2.514) (0.196)
Has MBBS -0.062 6.415* 0.206
(0.847) (3.805) (0.254)
Has some qualification -0.159 2.737 0.119
(0.435) (2.159) (0.156)
Age of provider -0.002 0.027 0.003 0.018 -0.004 0.003
(0.017) (0.088) (0.008) (0.024) (0.141) (0.010)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 1.460* 2.136 0.060 -0.343 -3.130 -0.186
(0.789) (4.284) (0.325) (0.605) (3.609) (0.315)
Patient load during visit -0.188*** -0.333 0.034 -0.132 -0.054 -0.033
(0.059) (0.609) (0.044) (0.103) (0.614) (0.038)
R-squared 0.357 0.283 0.218 0.170
Number of observations 423 423 221 183 183 126
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. 
All regressions include a constant. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions, except in IRT score column where each 
observation is a provider. The score is computed using all cases, plausible values scores are used. Market fixed effects are used for the 
representative sample, and district fixed effects for dual practice sample. 
Table A.10: Robustness of provider effort results to exclusion of dysentery cases
Representative sample Dual practice sample
Panel A: SP and case fixed effects
Panel B: SP, case and market/district fixed effects





























Is a private provider 1.207*** 7.826*** 0.635** 0.197** -0.023 0.039 0.143* 0.082 0.115 -0.009 0.153* 0.861***
(0.363) (2.494) (0.305) (0.085) (0.126) (0.038) (0.073) (0.085) (0.076) (0.027) (0.081) (0.285)
Facilities index 0.012 1.679*** 0.129* 0.051** 0.014 0.010 0.034* 0.026 0.038** -0.001 0.029 0.203***
(0.112) (0.600) (0.072) (0.023) (0.033) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.004) (0.021) (0.078)
R-squared 0.356 0.265 0.233 0.362 0.161 0.410 0.379 0.267 0.280 0.275 0.313
Number of observations 634 634 220 420 171 420 420 420 420 420 420 420
Is a private provider 1.218*** 9.185*** 0.751*** 0.030 -0.035 -0.004 0.166** -0.121 -0.010 0.021 -0.146* -0.070
(0.259) (1.927) (0.213) (0.081) (0.135) (0.069) (0.072) (0.076) (0.058) (0.028) (0.080) (0.207)
Facilities index -0.206 -0.928 -0.033 -0.040 -0.029 -0.029 -0.066* -0.016 0.002 0.001 -0.038 -0.249**
(0.157) (1.148) (0.111) (0.041) (0.079) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.014) (0.045) (0.115)
R-squared 0.321 0.244 0.219 0.199 0.092 0.315 0.304 0.157 0.051 0.144 0.197
Number of observations 272 272 114 164 73 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Table A.11: Robustness of results to inclusion of facilties controls
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant and controls for provider qualifications, age, gender, and 
patient load. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions. Dual sample refers to providers who operate both public and private clinics. Market fixed effects are used for the representative sample, and district fixed 
effects for dual practice sample. Columns (1)-(3) include all cases and can be compared with Table 3. The remaining columns include Unstable Angina and Asthma cases only - compare Columns (4)-(6) with Table A6; and Columns (7)-
(12) with Table 4.  In column (12) the dependent variable is total number of medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or prescribed).
Panel A: Representative sample, with SP, case and market fixed effects

















Time spent with SP (minutes) 1.720*** 0.618 2.625*** 2.279*** 1.484*** 0.709*
(0.476) (0.477) (0.587) (0.692) (0.377) (0.401)
Percentage of checklist items 0.397*** 0.339*** 0.364*** 0.055 0.386*** 0.291***
(0.089) (0.096) (0.100) (0.129) (0.071) (0.084)
Correct diagnosis (unconditional) -4.269 -3.647* 7.504 5.494 2.690 2.685
(3.978) (1.993) (9.350) (9.046) (4.658) (4.148)
Correct treatment 6.199*** -1.564 7.744* 4.475 7.306*** 0.602
(1.757) (2.919) (4.145) (4.967) (1.934) (2.404)
Palliative treatment 7.711*** 2.198 10.435** 7.757 7.796*** 3.542**
(1.810) (1.722) (4.242) (4.873) (1.743) (1.726)
Unnecessary treatment 15.794*** 3.147 14.973*** 5.137 15.655*** 4.888*
(2.842) (2.963) (5.032) (6.240) (2.451) (2.746)
Dispensed medicines 19.525*** 16.400*** 16.118*** 12.371* 16.511*** 15.688***
(2.993) (2.726) (6.070) (7.019) (2.319) (2.830)
Prescribed medicines -2.931 -4.331 7.540 -2.854 0.071 -4.133
(3.600) (3.639) (5.997) (6.734) (2.918) (3.202)
Number of medicines 5.540*** 1.630 5.863*** 3.016 5.283*** 1.111
(0.842) (1.394) (1.783) (2.987) (0.787) (1.348)
Referred/Asked to see child -20.348*** -10.054*** -9.882** -4.867 -17.533*** -11.860***
(4.999) (3.683) (4.763) (4.888) (3.911) (3.021)
Has MBBS 23.517*** 27.905*** 14.155*** 23.516***
(6.150) (7.830) (4.369) (3.923)
Has some qualification 4.305 6.067*** 2.127 6.952***
(3.768) (2.282) (3.376) (2.370)
Patient load during visit 1.017 0.867** -0.073 -0.285 0.512 0.276
(0.888) (0.404) (0.807) (0.810) (0.748) (0.581)
Age of provider -0.186 -0.111 0.267 0.248 -0.119 -0.018
(0.155) (0.100) (0.239) (0.218) (0.126) (0.089)
Gender of provider (1=Male) -8.238** -5.876 -1.284 -3.760 -7.475** -3.810
(3.518) (4.543) (4.882) (5.580) (2.961) (3.919)
Constant 9.745 -11.295 2.234
(7.179) (11.810) (6.345)
R2 0.446 0.444 0.398
Number of observations 495 154 649
Mean price charged 27.638 32.740 28.849
SD 26.557 28.592 27.118
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. Observations are 
standardized provider-patient interactions. Interpretation of coefficents in "Binary regressions" needs caution. Each coefficient represents a separate regression of prices 
on the row variable and case and district fixed effects. Multiple regressions include case and district fixed effects. 
Table A.12: Correlates of price charged
(private interactions, excludes cases where all medicines are unidentifiable)
Fees in Rs.





Panel A: Staff per facility N Average monthly wage (Rs.)
Medical Officer in Charge/Medical Officer 1.92 Rs.32,245
GNM/ANM/VHN/LHV 3.24 Rs.16,305
MPW/MNA/Assistant/Compounder 1.43 Rs.16,657
Pharmacist/Chemist/Lab Assistant/Technician 0.8 Rs.16,571
Paramedic/other 6.08 Rs.13,387
All 13.47 Rs.17,315
Number of facilities 115








Table A.13: Cost in the public sector
Notes: We use an extremely conservative measure of per patient cost in the public sector facility. We assume that salary cost are the 
only cost in running a public health facility. Furthermore, we assume that every patient that visits the public health facility visits for 
a primary care visit, while people also visit public health facilities for preventative services such as vaccination. Wages data were 
collected in the year 2010, note that we use 2010 wage data to compute cost per patient in 2008 and 2009. Wages in 2008 and 2009 
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Is a dual provider -0.659*** -3.881* -0.329 -0.022 0.021 0.014 -0.007 -0.029 -0.029 -0.017 -0.106 -0.212 -0.015
(0.210) (2.045) (0.218) (0.057) (0.100) (0.034) (0.064) (0.072) (0.064) (0.026) (0.077) (0.209) (0.049)
R-squared 0.268 0.131 0.187 0.319 0.113 0.340 0.211 0.096 0.044 0.142 0.153 0.159
Number of observations 252 252 103 252 73 252 161 161 161 161 161 161 161
Mean of non-dual observations 2.343 22.788 0.326 0.207 0.067 0.295 0.705 0.836 0.033 0.541 2.885 0.131
Mean of dual observations 1.562 17.677 0.270 0.341 0.092 0.380 0.630 0.830 0.020 0.480 2.800 0.080
Mean of sample 1.838 19.482 0.290 0.288 0.083 0.348 0.658 0.832 0.025 0.503 2.832 0.099
Is a dual provider -0.677*** -4.285* -0.420* -0.065 -0.092 -0.020 -0.007 -0.005 -0.073 -0.012 -0.153* -0.293 -0.050
(0.248) (2.291) (0.253) (0.071) (0.140) (0.042) (0.077) (0.090) (0.073) (0.029) (0.088) (0.267) (0.060)
Age of provider -0.017* -0.077 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.028** 0.000
(0.009) (0.101) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.012) (0.002)
Gender of provider (1=Male) 0.097 1.275 -0.083 -0.073 -0.027 -0.023 0.032 0.160 0.147 -0.039 0.245** 0.434 -0.162
(0.342) (3.264) (0.368) (0.100) (0.202) (0.062) (0.127) (0.120) (0.106) (0.058) (0.123) (0.349) (0.102)
Patient load during visit -0.031 0.495 0.036 0.008 -0.019 -0.000 -0.010 0.033** 0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.006 0.020
(0.040) (0.584) (0.031) (0.011) (0.048) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.005) (0.026) (0.086) (0.017)
R-squared 0.310 0.143 0.198 0.375 0.145 0.360 0.259 0.202 0.099 0.255 0.248 0.275
Number of observations 215 215 90 215 62 215 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant. Observations are standardized provider-patient interactions.  In column (13) the 
dependent variable is total number of medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or prescribed).
Table A.14: Difference between dual and non-dual providers' treatment of SPs (public sample only)
Effort Diagnosis
Panel A: Dual practice sample, with SP, case and district fixed effects
Panel B: Dual practice sample, with SP, case and district fixed effects
Treatment
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)



















Is a private provider 1.632*** 11.288*** 0.235*** 0.033 0.079 0.162** 0.074 0.169 -0.014 0.143 1.147***
(0.388) (2.855) (0.090) (0.136) (0.054) (0.079) (0.077) (0.117) (0.056) (0.109) (0.429)
R-squared 0.453 0.417 0.430 0.714 0.363 0.592 0.447 0.353 0.218 0.435 0.463
Number of observations 286 286 192 76 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
Mean of public 2.547 16.000 0.271 0.154 0.042 0.271 0.521 0.708 0.042 0.250 2.063
Mean of private 3.613 24.551 0.438 0.238 0.104 0.438 0.535 0.750 0.049 0.292 3.014
Mean of sample 3.352 22.458 0.396 0.224 0.089 0.396 0.531 0.740 0.047 0.281 2.776
Is a private provider 3.216*** 16.987*** 0.263** 0.119 0.079 0.141 0.034 0.167 -0.027 0.222 1.581***
(0.916) (5.003) (0.116) (0.160) (0.056) (0.095) (0.104) (0.139) (0.028) (0.156) (0.503)
R-squared 0.586 0.501 0.610 0.823 0.487 0.616 0.699 0.468 0.540 0.473 0.674
Number of observations 191 191 129 63 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
Mean of public 2.481 18.832 0.333 0.133 0.044 0.200 0.556 0.689 0.022 0.178 1.800
Mean of private 4.708 30.269 0.571 0.146 0.083 0.286 0.595 0.845 0.012 0.310 3.381
Mean of sample 3.938 26.317 0.488 0.143 0.070 0.256 0.581 0.791 0.016 0.264 2.829
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the market level are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant and SP, case and market fixed effects. Observations are 
standardized provider-patient interactions.  In column (11) the dependent variable is total number of medicines recommended to the patient (dispensed and/or prescribed).
Table A.15: Robustness to alternative metrics for public-private comparison
Effort Diagnosis
Panel A: Best public vs. best private (by correct treatment)
Panel B: Best public vs. best private (by checklist items)
Treatment
